

Dell C5765dn Color Laser Multifunction Printer Security Target

Version 1.1.4

This document is a translation of the evaluated and certified security target written in Japanese.

September 2014

- Table of Contents -

1. ST	r introduction 1
1.1. 1.2. 1.3. 1.3.2 1.3.2 1.3.3 1.4. 1.4.2 1.4.2 1.4.2	 Environment Assumptions
2. CC	ONFORMANCE CLAIMS
2.1. 2.2. 2.2. 2.2.2 2.2.2	2. Package Claims
3. SE	ECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION19
3.1. 3.1.2 3.1.2 3.2. 3.3.	
4. SE	ECURITY OBJECTIVES
4.1. 4.2. 4.3.	Security Objectives for the TOE
5. EX	TENDED COMPONENTS DEFINITION
5.1.	Extended Components28

6. SEC	URITY REQUIREMENTS	29
6.1. S	ecurity Functional Requirements	
6.1.1.	Class FAU: Security audit	
6.1.2.	Class FCS: Cryptographic support	
6.1.3.	Class FDP: User data protection	
6.1.4.	Class FIA: Identification and authentication	
6.1.5.	Class FMT: Security management	
6.1.6.	Class FPT: Protection of the TSF	57
6.1.7.	Class FTP: Trusted path/channels	
6.2. S	ecurity Assurance Requirements	
6.3. S	ecurity Requirement Rationale	60
6.3.1.	Security Functional Requirements Rationale	60
6.3.2.	Dependencies of Security Functional Requirements	65
6.3.3.	Security Assurance Requirements Rationale	68
7. TOE	SUMMARY SPECIFICATION	69
7.1. S	ecurity Functions	69
7.1.1.	Hard Disk Data Overwrite (TSF_IOW)	70
7.1.2.	Hard Disk Data Encryption (TSF_CIPHER)	70
7.1.3.	User Authentication (TSF_USER_AUTH)	71
7.1.4.	System Administrator's Security Management (TSF_FMT)	77
7.1.5.	Customer Engineer Operation Restriction (TSF_CE_LIMIT)	78
7.1.6.	Security Audit Log (TSF_FAU)	79
7.1.7.	Internal Network Data Protection (TSF_NET_PROT)	81
7.1.8.	Fax Flow Security (TSF_FAX_FLOW)	
7.1.9.	Self Test (TSF_S_TEST)	84
8. ACR	ONYMS AND TERMINOLOGY	85
8.1. A	cronyms	
	erminology	
9. REFI	ERENCES	90

- List of Figures and Tables -

Figure 1: General Operational Environment	
Figure 2: MFD Units and TOE Logical Scope Figure 3: Authentication Flow for Private Print and Mailbox	
Figure 4: MFD Units and TOE Physical Scope	
Figure 5: Assets under and not under Protection	
	20
Table 1: Function Types and Functions Provided by the TOE	2
Table 2: User Role Assumptions	8
Table 3: TOE Basic Functions	9
Table 4: Categories of TOE Setting Data	20
Table 5: Threats Addressed by the TOE	21
Table 6: Organizational Security Policy	22
Table 7: Assumptions	22
Table 8: Security Objectives for the TOE	23
Table 9: Security Objectives for the Environment	24
Table 10: Assumptions / Threats / Organizational Security Policies and the	
Corresponding Security Objectives	24
Table 11: Security Objectives Rationale for Security Problem	25
Table 12: Auditable Events of TOE and Individually Defined Auditable Events	34
Table 13: Operations between Subjects and Objects Covered by MFD Access Control S	SFP
	40
Table 14: Rules for Access Control	41
Table 15: Rules for Explicit Access Authorization	10
	42
Table 16: Subjects, Information, and Operations that cause the information to flow .	
Table 16: Subjects, Information, and Operations that cause the information to flow.Table 17: List of Security Functions	43
	43 50
Table 17: List of Security Functions	43 50 51
Table 17: List of Security FunctionsTable 18: Security Attributes and Authorized Roles	43 50 51 52
Table 17: List of Security FunctionsTable 18: Security Attributes and Authorized RolesTable 19 Initialization property	43 50 51 52 53
Table 17: List of Security FunctionsTable 18: Security Attributes and Authorized RolesTable 19 Initialization propertyTable 20: Operation of TSF Data	43 50 51 52 53 54
Table 17: List of Security FunctionsTable 18: Security Attributes and Authorized RolesTable 19 Initialization propertyTable 20: Operation of TSF DataTable 21: Security Management Functions Provided by TSF	43 50 51 52 53 54 59
Table 17: List of Security FunctionsTable 18: Security Attributes and Authorized RolesTable 19 Initialization propertyTable 20: Operation of TSF DataTable 21: Security Management Functions Provided by TSFTable 22: EAL3 Assurance Requirements	43 50 51 52 53 54 59 ves
Table 17: List of Security FunctionsTable 18: Security Attributes and Authorized RolesTable 19 Initialization propertyTable 20: Operation of TSF DataTable 21: Security Management Functions Provided by TSFTable 22: EAL3 Assurance RequirementsTable 23: Security Functional Requirements and the Corresponding Security Objective	43 50 51 52 53 54 59 Ves 60
Table 17: List of Security FunctionsTable 18: Security Attributes and Authorized RolesTable 19 Initialization propertyTable 20: Operation of TSF DataTable 21: Security Management Functions Provided by TSFTable 22: EAL3 Assurance RequirementsTable 23: Security Functional Requirements and the Corresponding Security Objection	43 50 51 52 53 54 59 ves 60 61
 Table 17: List of Security Functions Table 18: Security Attributes and Authorized Roles Table 19 Initialization property Table 20: Operation of TSF Data Table 21: Security Management Functions Provided by TSF Table 22: EAL3 Assurance Requirements Table 23: Security Functional Requirements and the Corresponding Security Objective Table 24: Security Objectives to SFR Rationale 	43 50 51 52 53 54 59 ves 60 61
 Table 17: List of Security Functions Table 18: Security Attributes and Authorized Roles Table 19 Initialization property Table 20: Operation of TSF Data Table 21: Security Management Functions Provided by TSF Table 22: EAL3 Assurance Requirements Table 23: Security Functional Requirements and the Corresponding Security Objective Table 24: Security Objectives to SFR Rationale Table 25: Dependencies of Functional Security Requirements 	43 50 51 52 53 54 59 ves 60 61 65
Table 17: List of Security FunctionsTable 18: Security Attributes and Authorized RolesTable 19Initialization propertyTable 20: Operation of TSF DataTable 21: Security Management Functions Provided by TSFTable 22: EAL3 Assurance RequirementsTable 23: Security Functional Requirements and the Corresponding Security ObjectiveTable 24: Security Objectives to SFR RationaleTable 25: Dependencies of Functional Security RequirementsTable 26: Security Functional Requirements and the Corresponding TOE Security	43 50 51 52 53 54 59 ves 60 61 65 69
Table 17: List of Security FunctionsTable 18: Security Attributes and Authorized RolesTable 19 Initialization propertyTable 20: Operation of TSF DataTable 21: Security Management Functions Provided by TSFTable 22: EAL3 Assurance RequirementsTable 23: Security Functional Requirements and the Corresponding Security ObjectiveTable 24: Security Objectives to SFR RationaleTable 25: Dependencies of Functional Security RequirementsTable 26: Security Functional Requirements and the Corresponding TOE SecurityFunctions	 43 50 51 52 53 54 59 √es 60 61 65 69 74 75

1. ST INTRODUCTION

This chapter describes Security Target (ST) Reference, TOE Reference, TOE Overview, and TOE Description.

1.1. ST Reference

This section provides information needed to identify this ST.

ST Title:	Dell C5765dn Color Laser Multifunction Printer Security Target	
ST Version:	V 1.1.4	
Publication Date:	September 8, 2014	
Author:	Fuji Xerox Co., Ltd.	

1.2. TOE Reference

This section provides information needed to identify this TOE.

The TOE is C5765dn Color Laser Multifunction Printer.

The TOE is identified by the following TOE name and ROM versions.

TOE	Dell C7765dn Color Laser Multifunction Printer	
Identification:		
	Controller ROM	Ver. 2.205.1
Version:	IOT ROM	Ver. 3.0.2
version.	ADF ROM	Ver. 11.1.0
	Fax ROM	Ver. 100.19.0
Manufacturer:	Fuji Xerox Co., Ltd.	

1.3. TOE Overview

1.3.1. TOE Type and Major Security Features

1.3.1.1. TOE Type

This TOE, categorized as an IT product, is the Dell C5765dn Color Laser Multifunction Printer (hereinafter referred to as "MFD") which has the copy, print, scan, and fax functions. The TOE is the product which controls the whole MFD and protects the following against threats: The document data stored on the internal HDD, the used document data, the security audit log data, the document data exists on the internal network between the TOE and the remote, and the TOE setting data.

1.3.1.2. Function Types

Table 1 shows the function types and functions provided by the TOE.

Function types	Functions provided by the TOE	
	- Control Panel	
	- Сору	
	- Print	
Basic Function	- Scan	
Dasic Function	- Network Scan	
	- Fax	
	- Direct Fax (with local authentication only)	
	- Remote Configuration	
	- Hard Disk Data Overwrite	
	- Hard Disk Data Encryption	
	- User Authentication	
	- Administrator's Security Management	
Security Function	- Customer Engineer Operation Restriction	
	- Security Audit Log	
	- Internal Network Data Protection	
	- Fax Flow Security	
	- Self Test	

Table 1: Function Types and Functions Provided by the TOE

- Optional Fax card (out of the TOE boundary) is required to use Fax, Direct Fax, and Fax Flow Security functions.
- To use print, scan, and Direct Fax functions, the following items shall be installed to the external client for general user and that for system administrator: printer driver, Network Scan Utility, and fax driver.
- There are two types of user authentication, local authentication and remote authentication, and the TOE behaves with either one of the authentication types depending on the setting. In this ST, the difference of the TOE behavior is described if the TOE behaves differently depending on the type of authentication being used. Unless specified, the behavior of the TOE is the same for both authentication types.

There are two types of Remote Authentication: LDAP Authentication and Kerberos Authentication. To set SA (system administrator privilege) as user role assumption in Kerberos authentication, LDAP server is also necessary.

For Kerberos authentication, it is also possible to use Smart Card (CAC/PIV) instead of authentication from the control panel with an ID and a password. User information and certificates in Smart Card and an OCSP server are used for authentication.
 In the same way as other types of authentication, LDAP server is required for setting SA. For Smart Card authentication, an optional card reader (not included in TOE) needs to be connected.

1.3.1.3. Usage and Major Security Features of TOE

The TOE is mainly used to perform the following functions:

- Copy function and Control Panel function are to read the original data from IIT and print them
 out from IOT according to the general user's instruction from the control panel. When more
 than one copy of an original data is ordered, the data read from IIT are first stored into the
 MFD internal HDD. Then, the stored data are read out from the internal HDD for the required
 number of times so that the required number of copies can be made.
- Print function is to decompose and print out the print data transmitted by a general user client.
- Configuration Web Tool is to retrieve the document data scanned by MFD from Mailbox. It also enables a system administrator to refer to and rewrite TOE setting data via Web browser.
- Scan function and Control Panel function are to read the original data from IIT and store them into Mailbox within the MFD internal HDD, according to the general user's instruction from the control panel.

The stored document data can be retrieved via standard Web browser by using Configuration Web Tool or Network Scan Utility (with local authentication only).

- Network Scan function and Control Panel function are to read the original data from IIT and transmit the document data to FTP server, SMB server, or Mail server, according to the information set in the MFD. This function is operated according to the general user's instruction from the control panel.
- Fax function and Control Panel function are to send and receive fax data. According to the general user's instruction from the control panel to send a fax, the original data are read from IIT and then sent to the destination via public telephone line. The document data are received from the sender's machine via public telephone line and then printed out from the recipient's IOT or stored in Mailbox.
- The Direct Fax function is to send data from a user client to the destination via public telephone line (with local authentication only). The data are first sent to MFD as a print job and then to the destination without being printed out.

The TOE provides the following security features:

(1) Hard Disk Data Overwrite

To completely delete the used document data in the internal HDD, the data are overwritten with new data after any job of copy, print, scan, etc. is completed.

(2) Hard Disk Data Encryption

The document data and the security audit log data are encrypted before being stored into the internal HDD when using any function of copy, print, scan, etc. or configuring various security function settings.

(3) User Authentication

Access to the TOE functions is restricted to the authorized user and this function identifies and authenticates users. A user needs to enter his/her ID and password from the fax driver, Network Scan Utility, or Web browser of the general user client, or MFD control panel.

A user can also use Smart Card authentication (CAC/PIV) for identification and authentication.

(4) System Administrator's Security Management

This function allows only the system administrator identified and authorized from the control panel or system administrator client to refer to and change the TOE security function settings.

- (5) Customer Engineer Operation RestrictionA system administrator can prohibit CE from referring to and changing the TOE security function settings.
- (6) Security Audit Log

The important events of TOE such as device failure, configuration change, and user operation are traced and recorded based on when and who used what function.

(7) Internal Network Data Protection

This function protects the communication data on the internal network such as document data, security audit log data, and TOE setting data. (The following general encryption communication- protocols are supported: SSL/TLS, IPSec, SNMP v3, and S/MIME.)

- (8) Fax Flow Security This function prevents unauthorized access to the TOE or the internal network via Fax card from public telephone line.
- (9) Self Test This function verifies the integrity of TSF executable code and TSF data.

1.3.2. Environment Assumptions

This TOE is assumed to be used as an IT product at general office and to be connected to public telephone line, user clients, and the internal network protected from threats on the external network by firewall etc.

Figure 1 shows the general environment for TOE operation.




Figure 1: General Operational Environment

1.3.3. Required Non-TOE Hardware and Software

In the operational environment shown in Figure 1, the TOE (MFD) and the following non-TOE hardware/software exist.

(1) General user client:

The hardware is a general-purpose PC. When a client is connected to the MFD via the internal network and when the printer driver, Network Scan Utility, and fax driver are installed to the client, the general user can request the MFD to print, fax, and retrieve the document data. The user can also request the MFD to retrieve the scanned document data via Web browser by using scan function of the MFD. Additionally, the general user can change the settings which he/she registered to the MFD: Mailbox name, password, access control, and automatic deletion of

document.

When the client is connected to the MFD directly via USB and printer/fax driver is installed to the client, the user can request the MFD to print/fax the document data.

(2) System administrator client:

The hardware is a general-purpose PC. A system administrator can refer to and change TOE setting data via Web browser.

(3) Mail server:

The hardware/OS is a general-purpose PC or server. The MFD sends/receives document data to/from Mail server via mail protocol.

(4) FTP server:

The hardware/OS is a general-purpose PC or server. The MFD sends document data to FTP server via FTP.

(5) SMB server:

The hardware/OS is a general-purpose PC or server. The MFD sends document data to SMB server via SMB.

(6) LDAP server

The hardware/OS is a general-purpose PC or server. The MFD acquires identification and authentication information from LDAP server via LDAP. In addition, it acquires SA information of user role assumptions.

(7) Kerberos server

The hardware/OS is a general-purpose PC or server. The MFD acquires identification and authentication information from Kerberos server via Kerberos.

(8) OCSP Server

The hardware/OS is a general-purpose PC or server.

The MFD retrieves information on revocation status of certificates other than self-signed certificates from an OCSP server, if the certificate revocation retrieval setting is enabled.

(9) Card Reader

A card reading device for supporting PKI certification that uses Smart Card (CAC/PIV).

(10) USB Media

The USB Media is used for printing data stored in the USB Media and for storing scanned data.

The OS of (1) general user client and (3) system administrator client are assumed to be Windows XP, Windows Vista, and Windows 7.

The (6) LDAP server, (7) Kerberos server, and (8) OCSP server are assumed to be Windows Active Directory.

The (9) Card Reader is assumed to be SCR331 or SCR3310 v2.0.

1.4. TOE Description

This section describes user assumptions and logical/physical scope of this TOE.

1.4.1. User Assumptions

Table 2 specifies the roles of TOE users assumed in this ST.

Table 2:	User	Role	Assum	ptions

User	Role Description
Administrator of the	An administrator or responsible official of the organization which
organization	owns and uses TOE.
General user	A user of TOE functions such as copy, print and fax.
System administrator (Key operator + System Administrator Privilege [SA])	A user who is authorized to manage the device using the system administrator mode. A system administrator can refer to and rewrite the TOE setting for device operation and that for security functions via TOE control panel, and Web browser.
Customer engineer (CE)	A user who can configure the TOE operational settings using the interface for CE.

1.4.2. Logical Scope and Boundary

The logical scope of this TOE consists of each function of the programs recorded on the controller ROM.

Figure 2 shows the logical architecture of the MFD.




Figure 2: MFD Units and TOE Logical Scope

1.4.2.1. Basic Functions

As shown in Table 3, the TOE provides the functions of control panel, copy, print, scan, network scan, fax, Direct Fax (with local authentication only), and Remote Configuration to general user.

Function	Description
Control Panel	Control panel function is a user interface function for general user, CE, and
Function	system administrator to operate MFD functions.
Copy Function	Copy function is to read the original data from IIT and print them out from

	IOT according to the general user's instruction from the control panel. When more than one copy of an original is ordered, the data read from IIT are first stored into the MFD internal HDD. Then, the stored data are read out from the internal HDD for the required number of times so that the required number of copies can be made.
Print Function	Print function is to print out the data according to the instruction from a
	general user client. The print data created via printer driver are sent to the
	MFD to be analyzed, decomposed, and printed out from IOT.
	The print function is of two types: the normal print in which the data are
	printed out from IOT directly after decomposed and the Store Print in which
	the bitmap data are temporarily stored in the internal HDD and then printed
	out from IOT according to the general user's instruction from the control
	panel.
	There is also the function to print data stored in an external USB Media by
	designating the data from the control panel.
Scan Function,	Scan function is to read the original data from IIT and then store them into
Network Scan	the internal HDD or an external USB Media according to the general user's
Function	instruction from the control panel.
	A general user can retrieve the stored document data from a general user
	client via Configuration Web Tool or Network Scan Utility (with local
	authentication only).
	Network scan function is to read the original data from IIT and automatically
	transmit them to a general user client, FTP server, Mail server, or SMB server
	according to the information set in the MFD. A general user can request this
	function from the control panel.
Fax Function	Fax function is to send and receive fax data. According to the general user's
	instruction from the control panel to send a fax, the original data them read
	from IIT and sent to the destination via public telephone line. The document
	data are received from the sender's machine via public telephone line.
Direct Fax (with local	Direct Fax function is to directly fax document data to the destination.
authentication only)	According to the instruction from a general user client to send a fax, the print
Function	data created via fax driver are sent to the MFD, analyzed, and decomposed.
	Then, the data are converted to the format for fax sending and sent to the
	destination via public telephone line.
Remote	Remote Configuration Function enables System Administrator's Security
Configuration	Management by which a system administrator can access and rewrite TOE
Function	setting data. For this, a system administrator must be authenticated by his/her
	ID and password entered from Web browser of a system administrator client.
	In addition remote Configuration function is to retrieve the scanned
	document data and the received fax data that are stored in the internal HDD
	according to the instruction from Web browser of a general user client.

1.4.2.2. Security Functions

The security functions provided by the TOE are the following.

(1) Hard Disk Data Overwrite

To completely delete the used document data in the internal HDD, the data are overwritten with new data after each job (copy, print, scan, Network Scan, Fax, or Direct Fax) is completed. Without this function, the used document data remain and only the management data are deleted.

(2) Hard Disk Data Encryption

Some data such as the security audit log data and the document data in Mailbox remain in the internal HDD even if the machine is powered off. To solve this problem, the document data and security audit log data are encrypted before being stored into the internal HDD when operating any function of copy, print, scan, network scan, fax, and Direct Fax (with local authentication only), or configuring various security function settings.

(3) User Authentication

Access to the TOE functions is restricted to the authorized user.

A user needs to enter his/her ID and password from the fax driver, Network Scan Utility, or Web browser of the general user client, or MFD control panel. A user can also use Smart Card authentication on the control panel.

Only the identified and authenticated user can use the following functions:

a) Functions controlled by the MFD control panel:

Copy, fax (send), scan, network scan, Mailbox, and print (This print function requires the Accounting System preset from printer driver. A user must be authenticated from the control panel for print job.)

- b) Functions controlled by Network Scan Utility of user client(with local authentication only): Function to retrieve document data from Mailbox
- c) Functions controlled by Configuration Web Tool:

Display of device condition, display of job status and its log, function to retrieve document data from Mailbox, and print function by file designation

Among the above functions which require user authentication, some particularly act as security functions. The following are the security functions which prevent the unauthorized reading of document data in the internal HDD by an attacker who is impersonating an authorized user:

- The Store Print function (Private Print function) and the Mailbox function, which require user authentication from the control panel or Smart Card.
- The function to retrieve document data from Mailbox (Mailbox function) which requires user authentication by using Configuration Web Tool or Network Scan Utility (with local authentication only), and the Store Print function (Private Print function) by file designation using Configuration Web Tool.




Figure 3 shows the authentication flow of the above functions.

Figure 3: Authentication Flow for Private Print and Mailbox

• Store Print Function (Private Print Function)

When the MFD is set to "Save as Private Charge Print," and a user sends a print request from the printer driver in which the Accounting System is preset, the print data are decomposed into bitmap data, classified according to the user ID, and temporarily stored in the corresponding Private Print area within the internal HDD.

In the same way, when a user is authenticated by entering his/her ID and password from Configuration Web Tool for authentication, and the user sends a print request by designating the files within a user client, the print data are temporarily stored in Private Print area according to the user ID.

To refer to the stored print data, a user needs to enter his/her ID and password from the control panel or to use Smart Card (CAC/PIV). When the user is authenticated, the data on the waiting list corresponding to the user ID are displayed. The user can request printing or deletion of the data on the list.

• Mailbox Function

The scanned data and received fax data can be stored into Mailbox from IIT and Public Telephone Line (Fax card) which are not shown in Figure 3.

To store the scanned data into Mailbox, a user needs to enter his/her ID and password from the

control panel or to use Smart Card (CAC/PIV). When the user is authenticated, the document data can be scanned from IIT and stored into the internal HDD according to the user's instruction from the control panel.

To store the received fax data into Mailbox, user authentication is not required. Among the received fax data transmitted over public telephone line, the following data are automatically classified and stored into each corresponding Mailbox: the received fax data whose corresponding Mailbox is specified by the sender, the received fax data from a particular sender (the data are classified according to the sender's telephone number), and the received fax data from an unknown sender.

To retrieve, print, or delete the stored data in the Personal Mailbox corresponding to the each registered user's ID, user authentication is required; the MFD compares the user ID and password preset in the device against those entered by a user from the control panel, Configuration Web Tool, or Network Scan Utility(with local authentication only). For user authentication, Smart Card authentication is also available on the control panel.

(4) System Administrator's Security Management

To grant a privilege to a specific user, this TOE allows only the authenticated system administrator to access the System Administrator mode which enables him/her to refer to and set the following security functions from the control panel:

- Refer to and set Hard Disk Data Overwrite;
- Refer to and set Hard Disk Data Encryption;
- Set the cryptographic seed key for Hard Disk Data Encryption;
- Refer to and set the functions that use password entered from MFD control panel in user authentication;
- Set the ID and password of key operator (only a key operator is privileged);
- Refer to and set the ID of SA / general user, and set the password (with local authentication only);
- Refer to and set the access denial when system administrator's authentication fails;
- Refer to and set the limit of user password length (for general user and SA) (with local authentication only);
- Refer to and set the SSL/TLS communication;
- Refer to and set the IPSec communication;
- Refer to and set the S/MIME communication;
- Refer to and set the User Authentication;
- Refer to and set the Store Print;
- Refer to and set the date and time;
- Refer to and set the Self Test;

Additionally, this TOE allows only the system administrator, who is authenticated from the system administrator client via Web browser using Configuration Web Tool, to refer to and set the following security functions via Configuration Web Tool:

- Set the ID the password of key operator (only a key operator is privileged);
- Refer to and set the ID of SA / general user, and set the password (with local authentication only);
- Refer to and set the access denial when system administrator's authentication fails;
- Refer to and set the limit of user password length (for general user and SA, with local authentication only);
- Refer to and set Audit Log;
- Refer to and set the SSL/TLS communication;
- Refer to and set the IPSec communication;
- Refer to and set the SNMPv3 communication;
- Refer to and set the SNMPv3 authentication password.
- Refer to and set the S/MIME communication;
- Create/upload/download an X.509 certificate;
- Refer to and set the User Authentication;
- (5) Customer Engineer Operation Restriction

This TOE allows only the authenticated system administrator to refer to or enable/disable the Customer Engineer Operation Restriction setting from the control panel and Configuration Web Tool. For this, CE cannot refer to or change the setting of each function described in (4) System Administrator's Security Management.

(6) Security Audit Log

The important events of TOE such as device failure, configuration change, and user operation are traced and recorded based on when and who operated what function. Only a system administrator can supervise or analyze the log data by downloading them in the form of tab-delimited text file via Web browser using Configuration Web Tool. To download the log data, SSL/TLS communication needs to be enabled.

(7) Internal Network Data Protection

The communication data on the internal network such as document data, security audit log data, and TOE setting data are protected by the following general encryption communication-protocols:

- SSL/TLS
- IPSec
- SNMP v3
- S/MIME

(8) Fax Flow Security

A Fax card is an option and is connected to TOE controller board via the internal interface. An attacker cannot access the TOE or the internal network from public telephone line via the Fax card.

(9) Self Test

The TOE can execute the self test function to verify the integrity of TSF executable code and TSF data.

1.4.2.3. Settings for the Secure Operation

System administrator shall set the following to enable security functions in 1.4.2.2.

- Hard Disk Data Overwrite Set to [Enabled].
- Hard Disk Data Encryption Set to [Enabled].
- Passcode Entry for Control Panel Set to [Enabled].
- Access denial when system administrator's authentication fails Default [5] Times.
- User Passcode Minimum Length (for general user and SA) Set to [9] characters
- SSL/TLS
 Set to [Enabled]
- IPSec
 Set to [Enabled]
- S/MIME Set to [Enabled]
- User Authentication
 Set to [Local Authentication] or [Remote Authentication]
- Store Print
 Set to [Save As Private Charge Print]
- Audit Log
 Set to [Enabled]
- SNMPv3
 Set to [Enabled]
- Customer Engineer Operation Restriction Set to [Enabled]
- Self Test
 Set to [Enabled]

1.4.3. Physical Scope and Boundary

The physical scope of this TOE is the MFD. Figure 4 shows configuration of each unit and TOE physical scope.




Figure 4: MFD Units and TOE Physical Scope

The MFD consists of the PWB units of controller board and control panel, IIT, and IOT,ADF. The controller board is connected to the control panel via the internal interfaces which transmit control data, and the controller board is connected to the IIT board, and IOT board via the internal interfaces which transmit document data and control data.

The controller board is a PWB which controls MFD functions of copy, print, scan, and fax. The board has a network interface (Ethernet), fax interface (Fax card) and local interfaces (USB) and is

connected to the IIT board and IOT board.

The control panel is a panel on which buttons, lamps, and a touch screen panel are mounted to use and configure MFD functions of copy, print, scan, and fax.

The IIT (Image Input Terminal) is a device to scan an original and send its data to the controller board for copy, scan, and fax functions.

The IOT (Image Output Terminal) is a device to output image data which was sent from the controller board.

The ADF (Auto Document Feeder) is a device to automatically transfer original documents to IIT.

1.4.4. Guidance

The following are the guidance documents for this TOE.

- Dell C5765dn Color Laser Multifunction Printer User's Guide; KB3211EN0-4 (SHA1 hash value: 03f26d4d4dbd4eec1f3a4c4ea2fc3a783673abed)
- Dell C5765dn/C7765dn Security Function Supplementary Guide; KE3036EN0-1 (SHA1 hash value: 930f93de08df2629aed52f9de314e7df2adccffd)
- Dell C5765dn Smart Card Installation and Configuration Guide; KE3038EN0-2 (SHA1 hash value: 94d240600f17c5231676089a50e60335e0de7ef5)

2. CONFORMANCE CLAIMS

2.1. CC Conformance Claims

This ST and TOE conform to the following evaluation standards for information security (CC):

Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 1: Introduction and general model, Version 3.1 Revision 4 Japanese Version 1.0 Part 2: Security functional components, Version 3.1 Revision 4 Japanese Version 1.0 Part 3: Security assurance components, Version 3.1 Revision 4 Japanese Version 1.0

The security functional requirements of this ST conform to CC Part 2. The security assurance requirements of this ST conform to CC Part 3.

2.2. PP Claims, Package Claims

2.2.1. PP Claims

There is no applicable Protection Profile.

2.2.2. Package Claims

This ST conforms to EAL3.

2.2.3. Conformance Rationale

There is no applicable PP rationale since this ST does not conform to PP.

3. SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION

This chapter describes the threats, organizational security policies, and the assumptions for the use of this TOE.

3.1. Threats

3.1.1. Assets Protected by TOE

This TOE protects the following assets (Figure 5):

(1) Right to use MFD functions

The general user's right to use each function of the TOE is assumed as an asset to be protected.

(2) Document data stored for job processing

When a general user uses MFD functions of copy, print, fax, and scan, the document data are temporarily stored in the internal HDD for image processing, transmission, and Store Print. The user can retrieve the stored document data in the MFD from a general user client by Configuration Web Tool and Network Scan Utility (with local authentication only). The stored data include general user's confidential information and are assumed as assets to be protected.

(3) Used document data

When a general user uses MFD functions of copy, print, fax, and scan, the document data are temporarily stored in the internal HDD for image processing, transmission, and Store Print. When the jobs are completed or canceled, only the management information is deleted but the data itself remains. The residual data include general user's confidential information and are assumed as assets to be protected.

(4) Security audit log data

In the function of Security Audit Log, the important events such as device failure, configuration change and user operation are recorded based on when and who operated what function. For preventive maintenance and response to the events and detection of unauthorized access, only a system administrator can retrieve the log data stored in MFD by Configuration Web Tool. The log data are assumed as assets to be protected.

(5) TOE setting data

A system administrator can set TOE security functions from the MFD control panel or system administrator client by the function of System Administrator's Security Management. The setting data stored in the TOE (see Table 4) can be a threat to other assets if used without authorization and are assumed as assets to be protected.




Figure 5: Assets under and not under Protection

Note) The data stored in a general client and server within the internal network and the general data on the internal network are not assumed as assets to be protected. This is because TOE functions prevent the access to the internal network from public telephone line and it cannot be a threat.

Table 4 categorizes the TOE setting data recorded on NVRAM and SEEPROM of the controller board.

Categories of TOE Setting Data (Note)
Data on Hard Disk Data Overwrite
Data on Hard Disk Data Encryption
Data on use of password entered from MFD control panel in user authentication
Data on minimum password length of user password
Data on ID and password of key operator
Data on ID and password of SA/General user

Table 4:	Categories	of TOE	Setting	Data

Categories of TOE Setting Data (Note)						
Data on access denial due to authentication failures of system administrator						
Data on Customer Engineer Operation Restriction						
Data on Internal Network Data Protection						
Data on Security Audit Log						
Data on Mailbox						
Data on User Authentication						
Data on Store print						
Data on date and time						
Data on Self Test						

Note: The setting data other than TOE setting data are also stored on NVRAM and SEEPROM. Those setting data, however, are not assumed as assets to be protected because they do not engage in TOE security functions.

* Only the time zone / summer time information is saved in NVRAM as the data on date and time.

3.1.2. Threats

Table 5 identifies the threats addressed by the TOE. An attacker is considered to have the disclosed information on TOE operations and low-level attack capability.

Threat (Identifier)	Description					
	An attacker may remove the internal HDD and connect it to commercial					
T.RECOVER	tools so that he/she can read out and leak the document data, used					
I.KECUVEK	document data, security audit log data from the HDD without					
	authorization.					
	An attacker may access, read, or alter, from control panel or system					
T.CONFDATA	administrator client, the TOE setting data which only a system					
	administrator is allowed to access.					
T.DATA_SEC	An attacker may read document data and security audit log data from					
I.DAIA_SEC	control panel or Web browser without authorization.					
Т.СОММ ТАР	An attacker may intercept or alter document data, security audit log					
	data, and TOE setting data on the internal network.					
T.CONSUME	An attacker may access the TOE and use TOE functions without					
I.CONSUME	authorization.					

|--|

3.2. Organizational Security Policies

Table 6 below describes the organizational security policy the TOE must comply with.

Organizational Policy (Identifier)	Description
P.FAX_OPT	TOE shall ensure that the internal network cannot be accessed via public telephone line.
P.VERIFY	The TOE shall execute self-test to verify the integrity of TSF executable code and TSF data.
P.OVERWRITE	The TOE shall execute HDD overwrite to delete the used document data in the internal HDD.

Table 6: Organizational Security Policy

3.3. Assumptions

Table 7 shows the assumptions for the operation and use of this TOE.

Table	7:	Assumptions

Assumption (Identifier)	Description					
Personnel Confidence						
A.ADMIN	A system administrator shall have the necessary knowledge of TOE security functions to perform the given role of managing the TOE and shall not operate the TOE with malicious intent.					
A.USER	TOE users shall be trained and have competence about the TOE operation and precautions according to the policies of their organization and the product guidance.					
Protection Mode						
A.SECMODE	A system administrator shall configure and set the TOE properly according to the security policy of organization and the product guidance document to manage the TOE and its external environment.					
A.ACCESS	The TOE is located in a restricted or monitored environment that provides protection from unmanaged access to the physical components and data interfaces of the TOE.					

4. SECURITY OBJECTIVES

This chapter describes the security objectives for the TOE and for the environment and the rationale.

4.1. Security Objectives for the TOE

Table 8 defines the security objectives to be accomplished by the TOE.

Table 8: Security Objectives for the TOE

Security	Description
Objectives(Identifier)	Description
O.AUDITS	The TOE must provide the Security Audit Log function and its log data
0.AUDITS	which are necessary to monitor unauthorized access.
	The TOE must encrypt the document data, used document data, and
O.CIPHER	security audit log data to be stored into the HDD so that they cannot be
	analyzed even if retrieved.
	The TOE must provide encryption communication function to protect the
O COMM SEC	document data, security audit log data, and TOE setting data on the
O.COMM_SEC	internal network between TOE and the remote from interception and
	alteration.
O.FAX_SEC	The TOE must prevent the unauthorized access to the internal network via
U.FAA_SEC	Fax modem from public telephone line.
	The TOE must inhibit a general user from accessing the TOE setting data.
O.MANAGE	The TOE allows only the authenticated system administrator to access the
O.MANAOL	system administrator mode which enables him/her to configure the
	security functions.
O.RESIDUAL	The TOE must provide overwrite function to prevent the used document
O.RESIDUAL	data in the internal HDD.
	The TOE must provide the function to identify TOE user and allow only
O.USER	the authorized user to retrieve, and delete the document data and to change
	the password.
O.RESTRICT	The TOE must inhibit an unauthorized user from using the TOE functions.
O.VERIFY	The TOE must provide self-test function to verify the integrity of TSF
	executable code and TSF data.

4.2. Security Objectives for the Environment

Table 9 defines the security objectives for the TOE environment.

Table 9: Security Objectives for the Environment

Security Objectives(Identifier)	Description					
	A system administrator who is assigned by an organization administrator					
OE.ADMIN	as an appropriate and reliable person for this TOE management and who					
	receives necessary training to manage the TOE.					
	The system administrator shall ensure that users have competence by					
OE.USER	training users about the TOE operation and precautions according to the					
	policies of their organization and the product guidance.					
	A system administrator shall configure and set the TOE properly according					
	to the security policy of organization and the product guidance document					
OE.SEC	to manage the TOE.					
UE.SEC	In addition, a system administrator shall manage the external IT					
	environment according to the security policy of organization and the					
	product guidance document.					
OF DUVSICAL	The TOE shall be placed in a secure or monitored area that provides					
OE.PHYSICAL	protection from unmanaged physical access to the TOE.					

4.3. Security Objectives Rationale

The security objectives are established to correspond to the assumptions specified in Security Problem Definition, to counter the threats, or to realize the organizational security policies. Table 10 shows assumptions / threats / organizational security policies and the corresponding security objectives. Moreover, Table 11 shows that each defined security problem is covered by the security objectives.

Table 10: Assumptions / Threats / Organizational Security Policies and the Corresponding Security

Objectives

Security Problems												
Security Objectives	A.ADMIN	A.USER	A.SECMODE	A.ACCESS	T.RECOVER	T.CONFDATA	T.COMM_TAP	T.DATA_SEC	T.CONSUME	P.FAX_OPT	P.VERIFY	P. OVERWRITE
O.AUDITS						✓		✓				
O.CIPHER					✓							
O.COMM_SEC							✓					

Security Problems												
Security Objectives	A.ADMIN	A.USER	A.SECMODE	A.ACCESS	T.RECOVER	T.CONFDATA	T.COMM_TAP	T.DATA_SEC	T.CONSUME	P.FAX_OPT	P.VERIFY	P. OVERWRITE
O.FAX_SEC										✓		
O.MANAGE						✓		✓				
O.RESIDUAL												✓
O.VERIFY											~	
O.USER						~		~				
O.RESTRICT									✓			
OE.ADMIN	✓											
OE.USER		~										
OE.SEC			~		~	~	~	~			~	\checkmark
OE.PHYSICAL				~								

Table 11: Security Objectives Rationale for Security Problem

Security Problem	Security Objectives Rationale					
	By satisfying the following objective, A.ADMIN can be realized:					
	By OE.ADMIN, a system administrator is assigned by an organization					
A.ADMIN	administrator as an appropriate and reliable person for this TOE					
	management, and receives necessary training to manage the TOE and					
	performs the TOE management according to the guidance.					
	By satisfying the following objective, A.USER can be realized:					
A.USER	By OE.USER, a system administrator trains users about the TOE					
A.USLK	operation and precautions according to the policies of their					
	organization and the product guidance, and users have competence.					
	By satisfying the following objectives, A.SECMODE can be realized:					
	By OE.SEC, a system administrator shall configure and set the TOE					
	properly according to the security policy of organization and the					
A.SECMODE	product guidance document to manage the TOE.					
	In addition, a system administrator shall manage the external IT					
	environment according to the security policy of organization and the					
	product guidance document.					
	By satisfying the following objective, A.ACCESS can be realized:					
A.ACCESS	By OE.PHYSICAL, a system administrator places the TOE in a secure					
A.ACCESS	or monitored area that provides protection from unmanaged physical					
	access to the TOE.					

Security Problem	Security Objectives Rationale
	By satisfying the following objective, T.RECOVER can be countered:
	By OE.SEC, it is necessary to enable the TOE security functions (i.e.
	Hard Disk Data Overwrite) and disable the reading-out of the
	document data and security audit log data in the internal HDD as well
T.RECOVER	as the recovery of the used document data. To be specific, this threat
	can be countered by the following security objectives: O.CIPHER.
	By O.CIPHER, the document data and security audit log data in the
	internal HDD are encrypted to disable the reference and reading-out of
	the document data, used document data, and security audit log data.
	By satisfying the following objective, T.CONFDATA can be
	countered:
	By OE.SEC, it is necessary to enable the security functions (i.e. User
	Authentication with Password, System Administrator Password,
	Access Denial due to System Administrator's Authentication Failures,
	Customer Engineer Operation Restriction, and Security Audit Log) and
	permits only the authenticated system administrator to change the TOE
	setting data. In addition, it is necessary to manage the external IT
	environment according to the security policy of organization and the
T.CONFDATA	product guidance document.
	To be specific, this threat can be countered by the following security
	objectives, O.MANAGE, O.USER, and O.AUDITS:
	By O.MANAGE, only the authenticated system administrator is
	allowed to enable/disable the TOE security functions and to refer to /
	update the TOE setting data.
	By O.USER, only the authorized user is allowed to change the
	password.
	By O.AUDITS, the audit log function necessary to monitor
	unauthorized access and the security audit log data are provided.
TCONSUME	By satisfying the following objective, T.CONSUME can be countered.
T.CONSUME	By O.RESTRICT, the access to the TOE can be controlled.
	By satisfying the following objectives, T.COMM_TAP can be
	countered.
	By OE.SEC, the document data, security audit log data, and TOE
	setting data on the internal network can be protected from interception.
T.COMM_TAP	By O.COMM_SEC, the client/server authentication function of
	encryption communication protocol allows only the authorized user to
	send/receive the communication data. Encrypting communication data
	with encryption function also disables the interception and alteration of
	the internal network data (incl. document data, security audit log data,
	and TOE setting data).

Security Problem	Security Objectives Rationale
	By satisfying the following objectives, T.DATA_SEC can be countered.
	By OE.SEC, it is necessary to enable the following passwords, user
	authentication function, and security audit log function: User Password,
	System Administrator Password, Local Authentication or Remote
	Authentication, Security Audit Log. Then, only the authenticated user
	is allowed to access the security audit log data and document data. In
	addition, it is necessary to manage the external IT environment
T.DATA_SEC	according to the security policy of organization and the product
	guidance document.
	By O.USER, only the authenticated user is allowed to read out the
	document data and security audit log data stored in the internal HDD.
	By O.MANAGE, only the authenticated system administrator is
	allowed to configure the TOE security functions.
	By O.AUDITS, the audit log function necessary to monitor
	unauthorized access and the security audit log data are provided.
	By satisfying the following objectives, P.FAX_OPT can be observed.
	By O.FAX_SEC, the access to the internal network via public
P.FAX_OPT	telephone line is disabled. This realizes P.FAX_OPT.
	Since the data received from public telephone line are not sent to the
	internal network, the internal network cannot be accessed.
P. VERIFY	By satisfying the following objectives, P .VERIFY can be observed.
	By OE.SEC, it is necessary to enable the following security function,
	and execute self-test to verify the integrity of TSF executable code and
	TSF data.
	-Self Test
	The TOE can execute the self test function to verify the integrity of
	TSF executable code and TSF data.
	By satisfying the following objectives, P.OVERWRITE can be
	observed.
P.OVERWRITE	By OE.SEC, it is necessary to enable the following security function,
	and execute HDD overwrite to delete the used document data in the
	internal HDD
	-Hard Disk Data Overwrite
	The TOE can execute HDD overwrite to delete the used document data
	in the internal HDD.

5. EXTENDED COMPONENTS DEFINITION

5.1. Extended Components

This ST conforms to CC Part 2 and CC Part 3, and there are no extended components which shall be defined.

6. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS

This chapter describes the security functional requirements, security assurance requirements, and security requirement rationale.

The terms and phrases used in this chapter are defined below.

- Subject	
-----------	--

Term/phrase	Definition
Key Operator Process	Operation upon using Mailbox and Store Print when
	the user authentication of key operator succeeded.
SA Process	Operation upon using Mailbox and Store Print when
	the user authentication of SA succeeded.
General User Process	Operation upon using Mailbox and Store Print when
	the user authentication of general user succeeded.
Receiving information from	To receive the document data from the sender's
public telephone line	machine via public telephone line, as receiving fax
	data.
Sending information to public	To send the document data to the destination via public
telephone line	telephone line according to the general user's
	instruction from the control panel or client PC, as
	sending fax data.
Sending information to the	To send the Network Scan data to the destination, a
internal network	client PC, within the internal network.
Receiving information from the	To receive the print data or the Direct Fax (with local
internal network.	authentication only) data from the sender, a client PC,
	within the internal network.

- Object

Term/phrase	Definition
Mailbox	A logical box created in the MFD internal HDD.
	Mailbox can store the scanned document data or the
	document data received via fax, categorizing by users
	and senders.
Personal Mailbox	The Mailbox privately used by a general user. Each
	user can create his/her own Personal Mailbox.
Shared Mailbox	The Mailbox shared by any general user. Key operator
	can create the Shared Mailbox.
Store Print	A print function in which bitmap data (decomposed
	print data) are temporarily stored in the MFD internal
	HDD and then printed out according to the
	authenticated general user's instruction from the

	control panel.
Used document data stored in the	The remaining data in the MFD internal HDD even
internal HDD	after deletion. The document data are first stored into
	the internal HDD, used, and then only their files are
	deleted.
Document data	Document data means all the data including image data
	transmitted across the MFD when any of copy, print,
	scan or fax functions is operated by a general user.
Security Audit Log Data	The chronologically recorded data of important events
	of the TOE. The events such as device failure,
	configuration change, and user operation are recorded
	based on when and who caused what event and its
	result.

- Operation

Term/phrase	Definition
Delivery	MFD receives the data from public telephone line for
	fax function.
Modify of behavior	To change the settings of the following information:
	User Authentication (Local, Remote)
	Store Print (Save or Deletion of login failure job)
	Internal Network Data Protection (Certificate and
	encryption type)
	Hard Disk Data Overwrite (number of overwrite, data
	of overwrite)
Modify	Changes of TSF data and security attributes(user
	identifier).

- Data

Term/phrase	Definition
Data on public telephone line	The data which flow on public telephone line for fax
Fax data	communication.

- Security attributes

Term/phrase	Definition
General User role	Indicates the authority required for general user to use
	the TOE.
SA role	Indicates the authority required for SA to use the TOE.
Key Operator role	Indicates the authority required for key operator to use
	the TOE.
General User identifier	User ID and password used to authenticate and identify

	general user.
SA identifier	User ID and password used to authenticate and identify
	SA.
Key Operator identifier	User ID and password used to authenticate and identify
	key operator.
Owner identifier of Mailbox	Data on each Mailbox, incl. permitted user, box name,
(Personal, Shared)	password, conditions for deleting documents, etc.
Owner identifier of Store Print	Data on Private Print, incl. user ID, password,
	measures to be taken at authentication failure, etc.

- Entity outside the TOE

Term/phrase	Definition
System Administrator	This term covers both key operator and SA.
Key Operator	An authorized user who manages MFD maintenance
	and makes TOE security function settings.
System Administrator Privilege	The user(s) who manage MFD maintenance and
(SA)	configure TOE security functions. SA can be
	created/registered by key operator or the other SA who
	is already registered.
General User	Any person who uses copy, scan, fax, and print
	functions of MFD.

- Other terminology

Term/phrase	Definition
The Fuji Xerox's standard	The Fuji Xerox's standard algorithm to generate a
method, FXOSENC	cryptographic key. This is used when MFD is booted.
AES	The FIPS-standard encryption algorithm used for
	encryption/decryption of Hard Disk data.
Access denial due to	When the number of unsuccessful authentication
authentication failure of system	attempts of system administrator ID has exceeded the
administrator ID	specified number of times, the control panel does not
	accept any operation except power-on and power-off,
	and the web browser do not accept authentication
	operation until the MFD main unit is powered off/on.
Data on use of password entered	The data on whether to enable/disable the use of
from MFD control panel in user	password to be entered from MFD control panel in user
authentication	authentication. Included in the TOE setting data.
Data on minimum user password	Minimum user password length to set the SA/ General
length	User password from MFD control panel.
	Included in the TOE setting data.

Data on ID of key operator	ID data for key operator authentication. Included in the
	TOE setting data.
Data on password of key operator	Password data for key operator authentication.
	Included in the TOE setting data.
Data on ID of SA	ID data for SA authentication. Included in the TOE
	setting data.
Data on password of SA	Password data for SA authentication. Included in the
-	TOE setting data.
Data on ID of General User	ID data for general user authentication. Included in the
	TOE setting data.
Data on password of General User	Password data for general user authentication. Included
	in the TOE setting data.
Data on access denial due to	The data on whether to enable/disable access denial
authentication failures of system	due to authentication failure of system administrator
administrator	ID. They also incorporate the data on the allowable
	number of the failures before access denial. Included in
	the TOE setting data.
Data on Security Audit Log	The data on whether to enable/disable the function to
	trace/ record the important events of the TOE such as
	device failure, configuration change, and user
	operation, based on when and who operated what
	function.
Data on User Authentication	The data on whether to enable/disable the
	authentication function using the data on user
	authentication when copy, scan, fax, and print
	functions of MFD are used. It also incorporates the
	data on the setting. Included in the TOE setting data.
Data on Store Print	The setting data on whether to store the received print
	data to Private Print area or print it out. Included in the
	TOE setting data.
Data on Internal Network Data	The data on whether to enable/disable the general
Protection	encryption communication protocols to protect the
	communication data on the internal network such as
	document data, security audit log data, and TOE setting
	data. They also incorporate the data on the setting.
	Included in the TOE setting data.
Data on Customer Engineer	The data on whether to enable/disable Customer
Operation Restriction	Engineer Operation Restriction. Included in the TOE
	setting data.

Data on Hard Disk DataThe data on whether to enable/disable the functionEncryptionrelated to Hard Disk Data Encryption. They also incorporate the data on the encryption seed key.	
incorporate the data on the encryption seed key.	
Included in the TOE setting data.	
Data on Hard Disk Data The data on whether to enable/disable the function	ons
Overwrite related to Hard Disk Data Overwrite. They also	
incorporate the data on the number of pass (over	write
procedure). Included in the TOE setting data.	
Data on date and time The data on the time zone / summer time inform	ation /
present date and time Included in the TOE setti	
data.	0
Data on Self Test The data on whether to enable/disable the function	ons
related to Self Test. Included in the TOE setting	
Public telephone line The line/network on which the data flow for fax	
communication.	
System Administrator mode An operation mode that enables a system admini	strator
to refer to and rewrite TOE setting for device op	
and that for security functions according to the	
operational environment. This mode is distinguis	shed
from the operation mode that enables a general u	iser to
use the MFD functions.	
Certificate Defined in the X.509 which is recommended by	ITU-T.
The data for user authentication (name, identific	ation
name, organization where he/she belongs to, etc.	.),
public key, expiry date, serial number, signature,	, etc.
Printer driver Software to convert the data on a general user cl	ient
into print data written in page description langua	ıge
(PDL), a readable format for MFD. Used on the	user
client.	
Fax Driver Software for Direct Fax (with local authentication)	m
only) function, which enables a general user to f	ax data
to the destination directly from a general user cli	ent
through MFD. The user can send the fax data just	st as
printing. Used on the user client.	
Natural Soon Utility (with local Software for a concerl year align to retrieve the	
Network Scan Utility (with localSoftware for a general user client to retrieve the	

6.1. Security Functional Requirements

Security functional requirements which the TOE offers are described below. The security functional requirements are based on the class and component which are specified by the [CC part 2].

6.1.1. Class FAU:	Security audit
FAU_GEN.1	Audit data generation
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps
FAU_GEN.1.1	 The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events: a) Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions; b) All auditable events for the [selection, choose one of: minimum, basic, detailed, not specified] level of audit; and c) [assignment: other specifically defined auditable events].
	 [selection, choose one of: minimum, basic, detailed, not specified] <i>not specified</i> [assignment: other specifically defined auditable events] <i>the actions to be audited (defined by CC) and the corresponding auditable events (events to be recorded as execution log) of TOE. Shown</i>

Functional	Actions to be audited (defined by CC)	Auditable events of
Requirements		TOE
FAU_GEN.1	None	-
FAU_SAR.1	a) Basic: Reading of information from the audit	Basic: Successful
	records.	download of security
		audit log data.
FAU_SAR.2	a) Basic: Unsuccessful attempts to read information	Basic: Unsuccessful
	from the audit records.	download of security
		audit log data.
FAU_STG.1	None	-
FAU_STG.4	a) Basic: Actions taken due to the audit storage	None
	failure.	
FCS_CKM.1	a) Minimal: Success and failure of the activity.	None
	b) Basic: The object attribute(s), and object value(s)	
	excluding any sensitive information (e.g. secret or	

Table 12: Auditable Events of TOE and Individually Defined Auditable Events

in Table 12

[private keys).	
FCS_COP.1 a) Minimal: Success and failure, and the type of		None
	cryptographic operation.	
	b) Basic: Any applicable cryptographic mode(s) of	
	operation, subject attributes and object attributes.	
FDP_ACC.1	None	-
FDP_ACF.1	a) Minimal: Successful requests to perform an	Basic: Creation/deletion
	operation on an object covered by the SFP.	of Mailbox.
	b) Basic: All requests to perform an operation on an	User name, job
	object covered by the SFP.	information, and
	c) Detailed: The specific security attributes used in	success/failure
	making an access check.	regarding access to
		Mailbox and execution
		of Store Print.
FDP_IFC.1	None	-
FDP_IFF.1	a) Minimal: Decisions to permit requested	None
—	information flows.	
	b) Basic: All decisions on requests for information	
	flow.	
	c) Detailed: The specific security attributes used in	
	making an information flow enforcement decision.	
	d) Detailed: Some specific subsets of the	
	information that has flowed based upon policy	
	goals (e.g. auditing of downgraded material).	
FDP_RIP.1	None	-
FIA_AFL.1	a) Minimal: the reaching of the threshold for the	<minimal></minimal>
—	unsuccessful authentication attempts and the actions	Authentication lock of
	(e.g. disabling of a terminal) taken and the	system administrator
	subsequent, if appropriate, restoration to the normal	Authentication failure
	state (e.g. re-enabling of a terminal).	from control panel and
		Configuration Web
		Tool.
FIA_ATD.1	None	-
FIA_SOS.1	a) Minimal: Rejection by the TSF of any tested	<individually defined<="" td=""></individually>
	secret;	auditable events>
	b) Basic: Rejection or acceptance by the TSF of any	Registration of user and
	tested secret;	changes in user
	c) Detailed: Identification of any changes to the	registration data
	defined quality metrics	(password)
		(pussiona)

FIA_UAU.1	a) Minimal: Unsuccessful use of the authentication	< Basic >
MA_OA0.1	mechanism;	< Busic > Success/failure of
	b) Basic: All use of the authentication mechanism.	authentication
		aumentication
	c) Detailed: All TSF mediated actions performed before authentication of the user.	
FIA_UAU.7	None	-
FIA_UID.1	a) Minimal: Unsuccessful use of the user	< Basic >
	identification mechanism, including the user	Success/failure of
	identity provided;	authentication
	b) Basic: All use of the user identification	
	mechanism, including the user identity provided.	
FIA_USB.1	a) Minimal: Unsuccessful binding of user security	< Basic >
	attributes to a subject (e.g. creation of a subject).	Registration of system
	b) Basic: Success and failure of binding of user	administrator, and
	security attributes to a subject (e.g. success or	changes in user
	failure to create a subject).	registration data (role)
FMT_MOF.1	a) Basic: All modifications in the behavior of the	<basic></basic>
	functions in the TSF.	Changes in security
		function configuration.
FMT_MSA.1	a) Basic: All modifications of the values of security	<basic></basic>
	attributes.	Creation/deletion of
		Mailbox.
		User name, job
		information, and
		success/failure
		regarding access to
		Mailbox and execution
		of Store Print.
FMT_MSA.3	a) Basic: Modifications of the default setting of	None
_	permissive or restrictive rules.	
	b) Basic: All modifications of the initial values of	
	security attributes.	
FMT_MTD.1.	a) Basic: All modifications to the values of TSF	<individually defined<="" td=""></individually>
	data.	auditable events>
		Changes in registration
		data (ID, password) of
		system administrator,
		and in the setting of
		security functions.
EMT SME 1	a) Minimal: Use of the management functions	<pre>< Minimal ></pre>
FMT_SMF.1	a) Minimal: Use of the management functions.	
		Access to system

		administrator mode
FMT_SMR.1	a) Minimal: modifications to the group of users that	<minimal></minimal>
	are part of a role;	Registration of system
	b) Detailed: every use of the rights of a role.	administrator, changes
		in user registration data
		(role), and deletion of
		system administrator
FPT_STM.1	a) Minimal: changes to the time;	<minimal></minimal>
	b) Detailed: providing a timestamp.	Changes in time setting.
FPT_TST.1	a) Minimal: Termination of an interactive session	<basic></basic>
	by the session locking mechanism.	Execution of Self Test
		and the test result
FTP_TRP.1	a) Minimal: Failures of the trusted path functions.	<minimal></minimal>
	b) Minimal: Identification of the user associated	Failure of the trusted
	with all trusted path failures, if available.	Communication within a
	c) Basic: All attempted uses of the trusted path	specified period of time,
	functions.	and client host data
	d) Basic: Identification of the user associated with	(host name or IP
	all trusted path invocations, if available.	address)

FAU_GEN.1.2	 The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information: a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity (if applicable), and the outcome (success or failure) of the event; and b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the functional components included in the PP/ST, [assignment: other audit relevant information]. [assignment: other audit relevant information].
FAU_SAR.1:	Audit review
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FAU_SAR.1.1	The TSF shall provide [assignment: authorized users] with the capability to read [assignment: list of audit information] from the audit records.
FAU_SAR.1.2	The TSF shall provide the audit records in a manner suitable for the user to interpret the information.

[assignment: authorized users]*system administrator*[assignment: list of audit information]*all log information*

FAU_SAR.1.2 The TSF shall provide the audit records in a manner suitable for the user to interpret the information.

FAU_SAR.2Restricted audit reviewHierarchical to:No other components.Dependencies:FAU_SAR.1 Audit review

FAU_SAR.2.1 The TSF shall prohibit all users read access to the audit records, except those users that have been granted explicit read-access.

FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storageHierarchical to: No other components.Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation

FAU_STG.1.1 The TSF shall protect the stored audit records in the audit trail from unauthorized deletion.

FAU_STG.1.2 The TSF shall be able to [selection, choose one of: prevent, detect] unauthorized modifications to the stored audit records in the audit trail.

[selection, choose one of: prevent, detect]
- prevent

FAU_STG.4Prevention of audit data lossHierarchical to:FAU_STG.3 Action in case of possible audit data loss

- Dependencies: FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage
- FAU_STG.4.1 The TSF shall [selection, choose one of: "ignore audited events", "prevent audited events, except those taken by the authorized user with special rights", "overwrite the oldest stored audit records"] and [assignment: other actions to be taken in case of audit storage failure] if the audit trail is full.

[selection, choose one of: "ignore audited events", "prevent audited events, except those taken by the authorized user with special rights", "overwrite the oldest stored audit records"] - overwrite the oldest stored audit records

[assignment: other actions to be taken in case of audit storage failure] - *no other actions to be taken*

6.1.2.	Class FCS: FCS_CKM.1 Hierarchical to: Dependencies:	Cryptographic support Cryptographic key generation No other components [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation] FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
	FCS_CKM.1.1	TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [assignment: cryptographic key generation algorithm] and specified cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following: [assignment: list of standards].
		[assignment: list of standards]
		- none
		[assignment: cryptographic key generation algorithm]
		- the Fuji Xerox's standard method, FXOSENC
		[assignment: cryptographic key sizes] - 256bits
	FCS_COP.1	Cryptographic operation
	Hierarchical to:	No other components
	Dependencies:	[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
		FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
		FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
		FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
	FCS_COP.1.1	The TSF shall perform [assignment: list of cryptographic operations] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [assignment: cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following: [assignment: list of standards].
		[assignment: list of standards] - FIPS PUB 197
		[assignment: cryptographic algorithm] - AES
		[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]

- 256bits

[assignment: list of cryptographic operations] - encryption of the document data and security audit log data to be stored in the internal HDD and decryption of the document data and security audit log data retrieved from the internal HDD.

6.1.3.	Class FDP:	User data protection
	FDP_ACC.1	Subset access control
	Hierarchical to:	No other components.
	Dependencies:	FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
	FDP_ACC.1.1	The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: access control SFP] on [assignment: list of subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and objects covered by the SFP].
		 [assignment: access control SFP] <i>MFD access control SFP</i> [assignment: list of subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and objects covered by the SFP]. <i>subjects, objects, and operations between subjects and objects listed in Table 13</i>

Table 12. Operations between (which and Ohicata Covered h	WED Access Control SED
Table 13: Operations between S	ubjects and Objects Covered b	V MFD Access Control SFP
*	· ·	•

Subject	Object	Operation
Key operator process	Mailbox	Deletion of Personal Mailbox
		Creation of Shared Mailbox
		Deletion of Shared Mailbox
		Deletion of all document data
		Retrieval of all document data
	Store Print	Deletion of all document data
		Retrieval of all document data
SA process	Mailbox	Creation of Personal Mailbox
		Deletion of Personal Mailbox
		Deletion of all document data
		Retrieval of all document data
	Store Print	Deletion of all document data
		Retrieval of all document data
General user process	Mailbox	Creation of Personal Mailbox
		Deletion of Personal Mailbox
		Deletion of all document data
		Retrieval of all document data

		Store Print	Deletion of document data Retrieval of document data	
			Kernevai of abcument auta	
FDP_ACF.1	Security a	attribute based access	control	
Hierarchical to:	No other	No other components.		
Dependencies:	FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control			
	FMT_MS	SA.3 Static attribute in	itialization	
FDP_ACF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: acc				
			ment: list of subjects and objects	
			SFP, and for each, the SFP-relevant	
	security a	ittributes, or named gr	oups of SFP-relevant security attributes].	
	- 0	ent: access control SFI	2]	
	- MFD access control SFP			
	[assignment: list of subjects and objects controlled under the indicated			
			vant security attributes, or named groups	
of SFP-relevant security attributes].				
	- general user identifier corresponding to the general user process,			
	-	identifier corresponding to the SA process, Key operator identifier		
	corresponding to the Key operator process, - owner identifier corresponding to each Mailbox, owner identifier			
		iding to each Store Pr		
FDP_ACF.1.2	The TSI	F shall enforce the foll	owing rules to determine if an operation	
	among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:			
	[assignment: rules governing access among controlled subjects and			
	controll	ed objects using contro	olled operations on controlled objects].	
	[assignr	nent: rules governing	access among controlled subjects and	
	controlled objects using controlled operations on controlled objects].			
	- the rules, shown in Table 14, for controlling the access among			
	controll objects	ed subjects using the c	controlled operations on the controlled	

Table 14: Rules for Access Control

Rules for Mailbox Operation in the General User Process and SA Process
- Creation of Personal Mailbox
In the general user process and SA process to create Personal Mailbox, the Personal
Mailbox in which general user identifier and SA identifier are set as its owner is

created.
- Deletion of Personal Mailbox
When the general user identifier and SA identifier of the general user process and SA
process match the owner identifier of Personal Mailbox, deletion of the
corresponding Personal Mailbox is allowed.
- Retrieval and deletion of document data in Personal Mailbox
When the general user identifier and SA identifier of the general user process and SA
process match the owner identifier of Mailbox, retrieval and deletion of the document
data inside are allowed.
- Retrieval and deletion of document data in Shared Mailbox
Retrieval and deletion of document data in Shared Mailbox are allowed.
Rules for Store Print Operation in the General User Process and SA Process
- Deletion and retrieval of document data
When the general user identifier and SA identifier of the general user process and SA
process match the owner identifier of Store Print, retrieval and deletion of the
document data inside are allowed. When the document data are deleted, the
corresponding Store Print area is also deleted.
Mailbox Operation in the Key Operator Process
-In the key operator process, creation and deletion of Shared Mailbox in which the
key operator identifier is set are allowed, and deletion of Personal Mailbox by all
key operator taentifier is set are anowea, and acterion of retisonal mattoox by all

FDP_ACF.1.3The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based on
the following additional rules: [assignment: rules, based on security
attributes, that explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects].

[assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects].

- the rules, shown in Table 15, for explicitly authorizing access of the subject to an object based on security attributes.

Table 15: Rules for Explicit Access Authorization

Rule for Mailbox Operation in the Key Operator Process
- In the key operator process, deletion of all Mailbox, deletion and retrieval of the
document data inside are allowed.
Rule for Store Print Operation in the Key Operator Process and SA Process
- In the key operator process and SA process, regarding all Store Print, deletion and
retrieval of the document data inside are allowed.

FDP_ACF.1.4 The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules [assignment: rules, based on security

attributes, that explicitly deny access of subjects to objects].

[assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny access of subjects to objects].*no rules that explicitly deny the access*

FDP_IFC.1	Subset information flow control
Hierarchical to:	No other components
Dependencies:	FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes

FDP_IFC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: information flow control SFP] on [assignment: list of subjects, information, and operations that cause controlled information to flow to and from controlled subjects covered by the SFP].

> [assignment: list of subjects, information, and operations that cause controlled information to flow to and from controlled subjects covered by the SFP]

- subjects, information, and operations that cause the information to flow, which are listed in Table 16.

Table 16: Subjects, Information, and Operations that cause the information to flow

Subject	Information	Operation
Receiving information from public	Data on public	Delivery
telephone line	telephone line	
Sending information to the internal		
network		

[assignment: information flow control SFP] - Fax information flow control SFP

FDP_IFF.1	Simple security attributes
Hierarchical to:	No other components
Dependencies:	FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control
	FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
FDP_IFF.1.1	The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: information flow control SFP]
	based on the following types of subject and information security
	attributes: [assignment: list of subjects and information controlled under
	the indicated SFP, and for each, the security attributes].

[assignment: information flow control SFP]

Fax information flow control SFP[assignment: list of subjects and information controlled under the indicated SFP, and for each, the security attributes] *none. (Sending information to public telephone line, receiving information from the internal network, and the corresponding data on the public telephone line are not controlled under the Fax information flow control SFP).*

FDP_IFF.1.2 The TSF shall permit an information flow between a controlled subject and controlled information via a controlled operation if the following rules hold: [assignment: for each operation, the security attribute-based relationship that must hold between subject and information security attributes].

> [assignment: for each operation, the security attribute-based relationship that must hold between subject and information security attributes] - the data received from public telephone line must not be sent to the internal network at any case

FDP_IFF.1.3 The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: additional information flow control SFP rules].

[assignment: additional information flow control SFP rules] - *none*.

FDP_IFF.1.4 The TSF shall explicitly authorize an information flow based on the following rules: [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorize information flows].

[assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorize information flows] - *none*.

FDP_IFF.1.5 The TSF shall explicitly deny an information flow based on the following rules: [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny information flows].

[assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny information flows]. - *none*.

FDP_RIP.1 Subset residual information protection

	Hierarchical to:	No other components
	Dependencies:	No dependencies
	FDP_RIP.1.1	The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource is made unavailable upon the [selection: allocation of the resource to, deallocation of the resource from] the following objects: [assignment: list of objects].
		[assignment: list of objects]
		- used document data stored in the internal HDD
		[selection: allocation of the resource to, deallocation of the resource from]
		- deallocation of the resource from
6.1.4.	Class FIA:	Identification and authentication
	FIA_AFL.1 (1)	Authentication failure handling
	Hierarchical to:	No other components
	Dependencies:	FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
	FIA_AFL.1.1 (1)	The TSF shall detect when [selection: [assignment: positive integer number], an administrator configurable positive integer within [assignment: range of acceptable values]] unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to [assignment: list of authentication events].
		[assignment: list of authentication events]
		- key operator authentication
		[selection: [assignment: positive integer number], an administrator configurable positive integer within [assignment: range of acceptable values]
		- [assignment: positive integer number]
		[assignment: positive integer number] - 5
	FIA_AFL.1.2 (1)	When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been [selection: met, surpassed], the TSF shall [assignment: list of actions].
		[selection: met, surpassed] - met
		- met [assignment: list of actions]
		- never allow the control panel to accept any operation except power
		cycle. Web browser is also inhibited from accepting authentication
		eyere. The browser is also inhibited from accepting dumentication

operation until the main unit is cycled.

FIA_AFL.1(2) Hierarchical to: Dependencies:	Authentication failure handling No other components FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_AFL.1.1 (2)	The TSF shall detect when [selection: [assignment: positive integer number], an administrator configurable positive integer within [assignment: range of acceptable values]] unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to [assignment: list of authentication events].
	 [assignment: list of authentication events] - SA authentication (with local authentication) [selection: [assignment: positive integer number], an administrator configurable positive integer within [assignment: range of acceptable values] - [assignment: positive integer number] [assignment: positive integer number] - 5
FIA_AFL.1.2 (2)	<pre>When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been [selection: met, surpassed], the TSF shall [assignment: list of actions]. [selection: met, surpassed] - met [assignment: list of actions] - never allow the control panel to accept any operation except power cycle. Web browser is also inhibited from accepting authentication operation until the main unit is cycled.</pre>
FIA_AFL.1 (3) Hierarchical to: Dependencies:	Authentication failure handling No other components FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_AFL.1.1 (3)	The TSF shall detect when [selection: [assignment: positive integer number], an administrator configurable positive integer within [assignment: range of acceptable values]] unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to [assignment: list of authentication events].
	[assignment: list of authentication events] - general user authentication

	<pre>[selection: [assignment: positive integer number], an administrator configurable positive integer within [assignment: range of acceptable values] - [assignment: positive integer number] [assignment: positive integer number] - 1</pre>
FIA_AFL.1.2 (3)	When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been [selection: met, surpassed], the TSF shall [assignment: list of actions].
	[selection: met, surpassed] - <i>met</i>
	[assignment: list of actions]
	- have the control panel to display the message of "authentication was failed" and to require reentry of the user information. The TSF shall also have Web browser and Network Scan Utility (with local authentication
	only) to reenter the user information
FIA_AFL.1 (4) Hierarchical to:	Authentication failure handling No other components
Dependencies:	FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_AFL.1.1 (4)	The TSF shall detect when [selection: [assignment: positive integer number], an administrator configurable positive integer within [assignment: range of acceptable values]] unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to [assignment: list of authentication events].
	[assignment: list of authentication events]
	- SA authentication (with remote authentication)
	[selection: [assignment: positive integer number], an administrator configurable positive integer within [assignment: range of acceptable values]
	- [assignment: positive integer number]
	[assignment: positive integer number] - 1
FIA_AFL.1.2 (4)	When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been [selection: met, surpassed], the TSF shall [assignment: list of actions].

[selection: met, surpassed]

	- met
	[assignment: list of actions]
	- have the control panel to display the message of "authentication was
	failed" and to require reentry of the user information. The TSF shall also
	have Web browser to reenter the user information
	have neb blowser to reemer the user information
FIA_ATD.1	User attribute definition
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	No dependencies.
FIA_ATD.1.1	The TSF shall maintain the following list of security attributes belonging
	to individual users: [assignment: list of security attributes].
	[assignment: list of security attributes].
	- Key Operator role
	- SA role
	- General User role
FIA_SOS.1.1	The TSF shall provide a mechanism to verify that secrets (SA password
	and U.NORMAL password when local authentication is used) meet
	[assignment: a defined quality metric].
	[assignment: a defined quality metric].
	- Password length is restricted to 9 or more characters
FIA_UAU.1	Timing of authentication
Hierarchical to:	No other components
Dependencies:	FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FIA_UAU.1.1	The TSF shall allow [assignment: list of TSF mediated actions] on behalf
	of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.
	[assignment: list of TSF mediated actions]
	- data receive from public telephone line
	- storing the print job delivered from user client
FIA_UAU.1.2	The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before
	allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
FIA_UAU.7	Protected authentication feedback
Hierarchical to:	No other components
Dependencies:	FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication

FIA_UAU.7.1	The TSF shall provide only [assignment: list of feedback] to the user
	while the authentication is in progress.
	[assignment: list of feedback]
	- display of asterisks ("*") to hide the entered password characters
FIA_UID.1	Timing of identification
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	No dependencies
FIA_UID.1.1	The TSF shall allow [assignment: list of TSF-mediated actions] on
	behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.
	[assignment: list of TSF-mediated actions]
	- fax receive from public telephone line
	- storing the print job delivered from user client
FIA_UID.1.2	The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before
	allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
FIA_USB.1	User-subject binding Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies:	FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition
FIA_USB.1.1	The TSF shall associate the following user security attributes with
	subjects acting on the behalf of that user: [assignment: list of user
	security attributes].
	[assignment: list of user security attributes].
	- Key Operator role
	- SA role
	- General User role
FIA_USB.1.2	The TSF shall enforce the following rules on the initial association of
	user security attributes with subjects acting on the behalf of users:
	[assignment: rules for the initial association of attributes].
	foreignments makes for the initial second distribution of the initial
	[assignment: rules for the initial association of attributes]. - <i>none</i>
FIA_USB.1.3	The TSF shall enforce the following rules governing changes to the user
	security attributes associated with subjects acting on the behalf of users:

[assignment: rules for the changing of attributes].

[assignment: rules for the changing of attributes]. - *none*

6.1.5. Class FMT:	Security management
FMT_MOF.1	Management of security functions behavior
Hierarchical to:	No other components
Dependencies:	FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
	FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_MOF.1.1	The TSF shall restrict the ability to [selection: determine the behavior of,
	disable, enable, modify the behavior of] the functions [assignment: list of
	functions] to [assignment: the authorized identified roles].
	[selection: determine the behavior of, disable, enable, modify the
	behavior of]
	- enable, disable, or modify the behavior of
	[assignment: list of functions]
	- for security listed in Table 17
	[assignment: the authorized identified roles]
	- the roles listed in Table 17

Table 17: List of Security Functions

Security Functions	Operations	Roles
Use of password entered from MFD control	enable, disable	Key operator, SA
panel in user authentication		
Access denial due to authentication failure	enable, disable	Key operator, SA
of system administrator ID		
User Authentication	enable, disable,	Key operator, SA
	modify	
Security Audit Log	enable, disable	Key operator, SA
Store Print	enable, disable,	Kan an angton SA
Store Print	modify	Key operator, SA
Internal Network Data Protection	enable, disable,	Key operator, SA
	modify	
Customer Engineer Operation Restriction	enable, disable	Key operator, SA
Hard Disk Data Encryption	enable, disable	Key operator, SA
Hard Disk Data Overwrite	enable, disable,	Key operator, SA
	modify	

Self Test		enable, disable	Key operator, SA
FMT_MSA.1	Management of security attributes		
Hierarchical to:	No other components.		
Dependencies:	[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or		
	FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]		
	FMT_SMR.1 Security roles		
	FMT_SMF.1 Specification o	f Management Func	tions
FMT_MSA.1.1	The TSF shall enforce the [as	ssignment: access co	ontrol SFP(s),
	information flow control SFP(s)] to restrict the ability to [selection:		
	change default, query, modif	y, delete, [assignmer	nt: other operations]] th
	security attributes [assignment	nt: list of security at	tributes] to [assignment
	the authorized identified role	s].	
	[assignment: access control	SFP(s), information	n flow control SFP(s)]
	- MFD access control SFP		
	[selection: change default, o operations]]	query, modify, delete	e, [assignment: other
	- query, modify, delete,[assi	ignment: other opera	ations]
	[assignment: other operatio	ns]	
	- create		
	[assignment: list of security	attributes]	
	- user identifier, Mailbox ov	vner identifier, and S	Store Print owner
	identifier		
	[assignment: the authorized	l identified roles].	
	- the operations and roles li	isted in Table 18	

Table 18: Security Attributes and Authorized Roles

Security Attribute	Operations	Roles
Key operator identifier	modify	Key operator
SA identifier (with local	query, modify delete,	Key operator, SA
authentication only)	create	
General user identifier (with local	query, modify delete,	Key operator, SA
authentication only)	create	
Mailbox owner identifier	query, delete, create	General user , SA
(Personal Mailbox)		
All Mailbox owner identifier	query, delete, create	Key operator
(All of Personal Mailbox)		
Mailbox owner identifier	query, delete, create	Key operator
(Shared Mailbox)		

Store Print owner identifier	query, delete	Key operator, SA , General user
All Store Print owner identifier	query, delete	Key operator, SA

FMT_MSA.3 Hierarchical to: Dependencies:	Static attribute initialization No other components. FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MSA.3.1	The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: access control SFP, information flow control SFP] to provide [selection, choose one of: restrictive, permissive, [assignment: other property]] default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
	<pre>[assignment: access control SFP, information flow control SFP] - MFD access control SFP [selection, choose one of: restrictive, permissive, [assignment: other property]] - [assignment: other property] - Initialization property in Table 19</pre>

Table 19 Initialization property

Object	Security Attributes	Default
mail box	Owner identifier of mail box	Creator's user identifier and
store print	Owner identifier of store	available user identifier
	print	

FMT_MSA.3.2 The TSF shall allow the [assignment: the authorized identified roles] to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is created.

[assignment: the authorized identified roles] - *none*

FMT_MTD.1	Management of TSF data
Hierarchical to:	No other components
Dependencies:	FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
	FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions

FMT_MTD.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to [selection: change default, query,

modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]] the [assignment: list of TSF data] to [assignment: the authorized identified roles].

[selection: change default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]

- query, modify, delete
- [assignment: other operations]]
- create

[assignment: list of TSF data]

- TSF data listed in Table 19
- [assignment: the authorized identified roles].

- the roles listed in Table 20

Table 20: O	peration of TSF Data

TSF Data	Operations	Roles
Data on key operator ID	modify	Key operator
Data on key operator Password	modify	Key operator
Data on SA ID (with local	query, modify , delete,	Key operator, SA
authentication only)	create	
Data on SA Password (with local	modify	Key operator, SA
authentication only)		
Data on General user ID (with local	query, modify, delete,	Key operator, SA
authentication only)	create	
Data on General user Password (with	modify	Key operator,
local authentication only)		SA ,General user
Data on User Authentication	query, modify	Key operator, SA
Data on use of password entered from	query, modify	Key operator, SA
MFD control panel in user		
authentication		
Data on minimum password length of	anom, modify	Kay an angton SA
user password (with local	query, modify	Key operator, SA
authentication only)		
Data on store print	query, modify	Key operator, SA
Data on Access denial due to	query, modify	Key operator, SA
authentication failure of system		
administrator		
Data on Security Audit Log	query, modify	Key operator, SA
Data on Internal Network Data	query, modify, delete	Key operator, SA
Protection		

Data on Customer Engineer Operation	query, modify	Key operator, SA
Restriction		
Data on Hard Disk Data Encryption	query, modify	Key operator, SA
Data on Hard Disk Data Overwrite	query, modify	Key operator, SA
Data on date and time	query, modify	Key operator, SA
Data on Self Test	query, modify	Key operator, SA

FMT_SMF.1	Specification of Management Functions
Hierarchical to:	No other components
Dependencies:	No dependencies

FMT_SMF.1.1The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management
functions: [assignment: list of management functions to be provided by
the TSF].

[assignment: list of management functions to be provided by the TSF] - Security Management Functions listed in Table 21

Functional	Management items defined by CC	Management functions of
requirements		TOE
FAU_GEN.1	There are no management activities	Management of data on
	foreseen.	Security Audit Log settings
FAU_SAR.1	a) maintenance (deletion, modification,	Management of data on key
	addition) of the group of users with read	operator (ID and password)
	access right to the audit records.	Management of data on SA
	access right to the dualt records.	(ID and password) (with
		local authentication only)
FAU_SAR.2	None	-
FAU_STG.1	None	-
FAU_STG.4	a) maintenance (deletion, modification,	None
	addition) of actions to be taken in case of	Reason: The control
	audit storage failure.	parameter of audit log is
		fixed and is not managed.
FCS_CKM.1	None	-
FCS_COP.1	None	Management of data on
		Hard Disk Data Encryption
FDP_ACC.1	None	-
FDP_ACF.1	a) Managing the attributes used to make	Management of owner
		identifier of Mailbox
	explicit access or denial based decisions.	Management of owner
		identifier of store print
		Management of data on store
		print
FDP_IFC.1	None	-
FDP_IFF.1	a) Managing the attributes used to make	None

Table 21: Security Management Functions Provided by TSF

	explicit access based decisions.	Reason: Access is restricted and does not need to be
		managed.
FDP_RIP.1	a) The choice of when to perform residual information protection (i.e. upon allocation	Management of data on Hard Disk Data Overwrite
	or deallocation) could be made configurable within the TOE.	
FIA_AFL.1	a) Management of the threshold for unsuccessful authentication attempts;	Management of allowable number of system
	b) Management of actions to be taken in the event of an authentication failure.	administrator's authentication failures
		Management of Access Denial
FIA_ATD.1	a) if so indicated in the assignment, the	None Reason: There are no
	authorized administrator might be able to define additional security attributes for	additional security attributes and there are no additional
	users.	security attributes to be managed.
FIA_SOS.1	a) the management of the metric used to	- Management of data on minimum password length of
	verify the secrets.	user password
FIA_UAU.1	a) Management of the authentication data	- Management of data on use
	by an administrator;	of password entered from
	b) Management of the authentication data	MFD control panel in user
	by the associated user;	authentication.
	c) Managing the list of actions that can be taken before the user is authenticated.	- Management of data on key operator(ID and password)
		- Management of data on SA
		and general user (ID and
		password) (with local
		authentication only)
		- Management of data on
		user authentication.
FIA_UAU.7 FIA_UID.1	None	-
FIA_UID.1	a) The management of the user identities.b) If an authorised administrator can	- Management of data on key operator(ID)
	change the actions allowed before	- Management of data on SA
	identification, the managing of the action lists.	and general user (ID) (with
		local authentication only)
		- Management of data on user authentication.
FIA_USB.1	a) an authorized administrator can define	None Reason: Action and security
	default subject security attributes.	attributes are fixed and are
	b) an authorized administrator can change subject security attributes.	not managed.
FMT MOF 1		Management of data on
FMT_MOF.1	a) Managing the group of roles that can	Management of data on

	interact with the functions in the TSF;	Customer Engineer Operation Restriction
FMT_MSA.1	a) managing the group of roles that can interact with the security attributes;b) management of rules by which security attributes inherit specified values.	None Reason: The role group is fixed and is not managed.
FMT_MSA.3	 a) managing the group of roles that can specify initial values; b) managing the permissive or restrictive setting of default values for a given access control SFP; c) management of rules by which security attributes inherit specified values. 	None Reason: The role group is only a system administrator and is not managed.
FMT_MTD.1.	a) Managing the group of roles that can interact with the TSF data.	Management of data on Customer Engineer Operation Restriction
FMT_SMF.1	None	-
FMT_SMR.1	a) Managing the group of users that are part of a role.	None Reason: The role group is fixed and is not managed
FPT_STM.1	a) management of the time.	Management of time and data.
FPT_TST.1	 a) management of the conditions under which TSF self testing occurs, such as during initial start-up, regular interval, or under specified conditions; b) management of the time interval if appropriate. 	Management of data on Self Test.
FTP_TRP.1	a) Configuring the actions that require trusted path, if supported.	Management of data on Internal Network Data Protection.

FMT_SMR.1 Hierarchical to: Dependencies:	Security roles No other components FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FMT_SMR.1.1	The TSF shall maintain the roles [assignment: the authorized identified roles].
	[assignment: the authorized identified roles] - system administrator, SA, general user
FMT_SMR.1.2	The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.

6.1.6.	Class FPT:	Protection of the TSF
	FPT_STM.1	Reliable time stamps
	Hierarchical to:	No other components.
	Dependencies:	No dependencies.
	FPT_STM.1.1	The TSF shall be able to provide reliable time stamps.
	FPT_TST.1	TSF testing
	Hierarchical to:	No other components.
	Dependencies:	No dependencies.
	FPT_TST.1.1	The TSF shall run a suite of self tests [selection: during initial start-up, periodically during normal operation, at the request of the authorised user, at the conditions [assignment: conditions under which self test should occur]] to demonstrate the correct operation of [selection: [assignment: parts of TSF], the TSF].
		[selection: during initial start-up, periodically during normal operation, at the request of the authorised user, at the conditions [assignment: conditions under which self test should occur]] - at the conditions [assignment: conditions under which self test should
		occur]
		[assignment: conditions under which self test should occur]
		- at initiation under which self test is set [selection: [assignment: parts of TSF], the TSF].
		- [assignment: parts of TSF]
		- TSF executable code
	FPT_TST.1.2	The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of [selection: [assignment: parts of TSF data], TSF data].
		[selection: [assignment: parts of TSF data], TSF data]
		- [assignment: parts of TSF data]
		- TSF data (excluding audit log data and present time data)
	FPT_TST.1.3	The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the
		integrity of [selection: [assignment: parts of TSF], TSF].
		[selection: [assignment: parts of TSF], TSF]
		- assignment: parts of TSF
		- TSF executable code in program ROM

6.

1.7.	Class FTP:	Trusted path/channels
	FTP_TRP.1	Trusted path
	Hierarchical to:	No other components.
	Dependencies:	No dependencies.
	FTP_TRP.1.1	The TSF shall provide a communication path between itself and [selection: remote, local] users that is logically distinct from other communication paths and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the communicated data from [selection: modification, disclosure, [assignment: other types of integrity or confidentiality violation]].
		[selection: remote, local]
		- remote
		[selection: modification, disclosure, [assignment: other types of integrity
		or confidentiality violation]].
		- modification, disclosure
	FTP_TRP.1.2	The TSF shall permit [selection: the TSF, local users, remote users] to
		initiate communication via the trusted path.
		[selection: the TSF, local users, remote users] - remote users
	FTP_TRP.1.3	The TSF shall require the use of the trusted path for [selection: initial user authentication, [assignment: other services for which trusted path is required]].
		[selection: initial user authentication, [assignment: other services for
		which trusted path is required]].
		- [assignment: other services for which trusted path is required]
		- TOE communication service via Web, communication service for
		printer driver, communication service for fax driver, communication service for network utility, communication service for other services
		which require trusted path

6.2. Security Assurance Requirements

The requirements for the TOE security assurance are described in Table 22. The evaluation assurance level of the TOE is EAL3. All the requirement components for assurance are quoted directly from the component of EAL3 specified by [the CC part 3].

Assurance				
Requirements	Assurance Component Name			
Class ADV: Develo	pment			
ADV_ARC.1	Security architecture description			
ADV_FSP.3	Functional specification with complete summary			
ADV_TDS.2	Architectural design			
Class AGD:	Guidance documents			
AGD_OPE.1	Operational user guidance			
AGD_PRE.1	Preparative procedures			
Class ALC: Life-cycl	e support			
ALC_CMC.3	Authorization controls			
ALC_CMS.3	Implementation representation CM coverage			
ALC_DEL.1	Delivery procedures			
ALC_DVS.1	Identification of security measures			
ALC_LCD.1	Developer defined life-cycle model			
Class ASE: Security	Target evaluation			
ASE_CCL.1	Conformance claims			
ASE_ECD.1	Extended components definition			
ASE_INT.1	ST introduction			
ASE_OBJ.2	Security objectives			
ASE_REQ.2	Derived security requirements			
ASE_SPD.1	Security problem definition			
ASE_TSS.1	TOE summary specification			
Class ATE: Tests				
ATE_COV.2	Analysis of coverage			
ATE_DPT.1	Testing: basic design			
ATE_FUN.1	Functional testing			
ATE_IND.2	Independent testing - sample			
Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment				
AVA_VAN.2	Vulnerability analysis			

Table 22: EAL3 Assurance Requirements	

6.3. Security Requirement Rationale

6.3.1. Security Functional Requirements Rationale

Table 23 lists security functional requirements and the corresponding security objectives. As shown in Table 23, each security functional requirement corresponds to at least one security objective of the TOE.

Table 24 shows the rationale demonstrating that each security objective is assured by TOE security functional requirements.

Security Objectives									
	ITS	ER	0.COMM_SEC	0.FAX_SEC	0.MANAGE	0.RESIDUAL	O.RESTRICT	~	FY
Security Functional	UD	O.CIPHER	MO	AX	IAN	ESI	ESJ	SEI	ERI
Requirements	O.AUDITS	0.C	0.C	O.F	O.N	O.R	O.R	O.USER	O.VERIFY
FAU_GEN.1	✓								
FAU_SAR.1	✓								
FAU_SAR.2	✓								
FAU_STG.1	✓								
FAU_STG.4	\checkmark								
FCS_CKM.1		\checkmark							
FCS_COP.1		\checkmark							
FDP_ACC.1								✓	
FDP_ACF.1								~	
FDP_IFC.1				~					
FDP_IFF.1				✓					
FDP_RIP.1						\checkmark			
FIA_AFL.1 (1)					~		\checkmark	\checkmark	
FIA_AFL.1 (2)					~		\checkmark	\checkmark	
FIA_AFL.1 (3)							\checkmark	\checkmark	
FIA_AFL.1 (4)							\checkmark	\checkmark	
FIA_ATD.1								\checkmark	
FIA_SOS.1									
FIA_UAU.1					~		✓	✓	
FIA_UAU.7					~		✓	✓	
FIA_UID.1					\checkmark		\checkmark	\checkmark	
FIA_USB.1								✓	
FMT_MOF.1					\checkmark				

Table 23: Security Functional Requirements and the Corresponding Security Objectives

Security Objectives									
Security Functional Requirements	0.AUDITS	O.CIPHER	O.COMM_SEC	O.FAX_SEC	O.MANAGE	O.RESIDUAL	O.RESTRICT	O.USER	O.VERIFY
FMT_MSA.1								✓	
FMT_MSA.3								\checkmark	
FMT_MTD.1					\checkmark			✓	
FMT_SMF.1					✓				
FMT_SMR.1					✓			✓	
FPT_STM.1	✓								
FPT_TST.1									\checkmark
FTP_TRP.1			~						

Table 24: Security Objectives to SFR Rationale

Security Objectives	Security Functional Requirements Rationale
	O. AUDITS is the objective that provides the function to record auditable
	events and its log data.
	By satisfying the following security requirements, O.AUDITS can be
	realized.
	By FAU_GEN.1, the security audit log data are generated for the
	auditable events: (However, audit is unnecessary for the following
	functional requirements for each reason described below.)
	- FAU_STG.4: The total number of security audit log data events is
	fixed. The data are stored and updated automatically.
	- FCS_CKM.1: When cryptographic key generation fails, a system error
O.AUDITS	occurs at the time of booting of the MFD.
000115	- FSC_COP.1: An encryption failure is monitored as job status.
	- FDP_IFF.1: The flow is fixed. No event is to be monitored.
	- FMT_MSA.3: No change is to be applied to default values and rules.
	By FAU_SAR.1, the authorized system administrator can read the
	security audit log data from an audit log file.
	By FAU_SAR.2, only the authorized system administrator can access the
	security audit log data.
	By FAU_STG.1, the security audit log data stored in an audit log file is
	protected from unauthorized deletion and alteration.
	By FAU_STG.4, when the security audit log data is full, the oldest stored
	audit record is overwritten and a new audit event is stored into the audit

Security Objectives	Security Functional Requirements Rationale
	log file.
	By FPT_STM.1, the auditable events are recorded with time stamp in the
	audit log, using highly reliable clock of the TOE.
	O. CIPHER is the objective that encrypts the used document data and the
	security audit log data i in the internal HDD so that they cannot be
	analyzed even if retrieved.
	By satisfying the following security requirements, O.CIPHER can be
	realized.
O.CIPHER	By FCS_CKM.1, the cryptographic key is generated in accordance with
	the specified cryptographic key size (256 bits).
	By FCS_COP.1, the document data and security audit log data to be
	stored into the internal HDD are encrypted and then decrypted when the
	data are read, in accordance with the determined cryptographic algorithm
	and cryptographic key size.
	O.COMM_SEC is the objective that protects the document data, security
	audit log data, and TOE setting data on the internal network from
	interception and alteration.
	By satisfying the following security requirements, O.COMM_SEC can
O.COMM_SEC	be realized:
	By FTP_TRP.1, a highly reliable communication path is provided
	through communication data encryption protocol so that the document
	data, security audit log data, and TOE setting data on the internal
	network between the TOE and the remote can be protected from threats.
	O.FAX_SEC is the objective that prevents the unauthorized access to the
	internal network via public telephone line.
	By satisfying the following security requirements, O.FAX_SEC can be
O.FAX_SEC	realized:
	By FDP_IFC.1 and FDP_IFF.1, the internal network to which the TOE is
	connected is prevented from being accessed via public telephone line
	from the communication path of TOE fax modem.
	O. MANAGE is the objective that allows only an authenticated system
	administrator to access the system administrator mode for security
	function setting and inhibits a general user from accessing the TOE
	setting data. By satisfying the following security requirements,
O.MANAGE	O.MANAGE can be realized:
	By FIA_AFL.1 (1), successive attacks are prevented because the power
	needs to be cycled when the number of key operator authentication
	failures reaches the defined number of times.
	By FIA_AFL.1 (2), successive attacks are prevented because the power
	needs to be cycled when the number of SA authentication failures (at

Security Objectives	Security Functional Requirements Rationale		
	local authentication) reaches the defined number of times.		
	By FIA_UAU.1 and FIA_UID.1, user authentication is performed to		
	identify an authorized system administrator or general user.		
	By FIA_UAU.7, unauthorized disclosure of the authentication		
	information (password) is prevented because the authentication feedback		
	is protected.		
	By FMT_MOF.1, the person who enables/disables TOE security		
	functions and makes functional settings is limited to system		
	administrator.		
	By FMT_MTD.1, the person who can make settings of TOE security		
	functions is limited to system administrator. Thus, only system		
	administrators can query, modify, and create TSF data.		
	By FMT_SMF.1, TOE security management functions are provided for		
	system administrator.		
	By FMT_SMR.1 (1), the role related to the security is limited to system		
	administrator by maintaining the role of system administrator as a user		
	who has special authority.		
	O.RESIDUAL is the objective that disables the reproduction and		
	recovery of the used document data in the internal HDD.		
O.RESIDUAL	By satisfying the following security requirements, O.RESIDUAL can be		
U.RESIDUAL	realized:		
	By FDP_RIP.1, the previous information of the used document data		
	stored in the internal HDD is made unavailable.		
	O.RESTRICT is the objective that offers the function to inhibit an		
	unauthorized person from using the TOE.		
	By satisfying the following security requirements, O.RESTRICT can be		
	realized:		
	By FIA_AFL.1 (1), successive attacks are prevented because the power		
	needs to be cycled when the number of key operator authentication		
	failures reaches the defined number of times.		
	By FIA_AFL.1 (2), successive attacks are prevented because the power		
O.RESTRICT	needs to be cycled when the number of SA authentication failures (at		
	local authentication) reaches the defined number of times.		
	By FIA_AFL.1 (3), when general user authentication fails, "incorrect		
	password" message is displayed, requesting password re-entry.		
	By FIA_AFL.1 (4), when SA authentication fails (at remote		
	authentication), "incorrect password" message is displayed, requesting		
	password re-entry.		
	By FIA_UIA.1 and FIA_UID.1, user authentication is performed to		
	identify an authorized general user and system administrator.		

Security Objectives	Security Functional Requirements Rationale		
	By FIA_UAU.7, unauthorized disclosure of the authentication		
	information (password) is prevented because the authentication feedback		
	is protected.		
	O.USER is the objective that identifies the TOE user and allows only the		
	authorized user to retrieve, and delete the document data and to change		
	password.		
	By satisfying the following security requirements, O.USER can be		
	realized:		
	By FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1, user authentication is performed. Only		
	authorized user is allowed to operate the objects.		
	By FIA_AFL.1 (1), successive attacks are prevented because the power		
	needs to be cycled when the number of key operator authentication		
	failures reaches the defined number of times.		
	By FIA_AFL.1 (2), successive attacks are prevented because the power		
	needs to be cycled when the number of SA authentication failures (at		
	local authentication) reaches the defined number of times.		
	By FIA_AFL.1 (3), when general user authentication fails, "incorrect		
	password" message is displayed, requesting password re-entry.		
	By FIA_AFL.1 (4), when SA authentication fails (at remote		
	authentication), "incorrect password" message is displayed, requesting		
	password re-entry.		
O.USER	By FIA_ATD.1 and FIA_USB.1, each role of key operator, SA, and		
	general user is maintained and only the authorized users are associated		
	with the subjects.		
	By FIA_SOS1, the minimum length of password for SA and general user		
	is limited.		
	By FIA_UAU.1 and FIA_UID.1, user authentication is performed to		
	identify an authorized general user and system administrator.		
	By FIA_UAU.7, unauthorized disclosure of the authentication		
	information (password) is prevented because the authentication feedback		
	is protected.		
	By FMT_MSA.1, the query, modify, deletion, and creation of security		
	attributes are managed.		
	By FMT_MSA.3, the suitable default values are managed.		
	By FMT_MTD.1, the setting of password for key operator is limited to		
	key operator, that for SA is limited to key operator and SA, and that for		
	general user is limited to system administrator and the general user		
	(when it is his/her own).		
	By FMT_SMF.1, TOE security management functions are provided for		
	authorized users.		

Security Objectives	Security Functional Requirements Rationale		
	By FMT_SMR.1, the role of general user and system administrator is		
	maintained and associated with the general user and system		
	administrator.		
	O. VERIFY is the objective that provides the function to verify the		
	integrity of TSF executable code.		
	By satisfying the following security requirements, O. VERIFY can be		
	realized.		
	By FPT_TST.1 the TOE can execute the self test function to verify the		
O. VERIFY	integrity of TSF executable code and TSF data upon initiation.		
	: (However, verification is unnecessary for the following TSF data for		
	each reason described below.)		
	- Security audit log data: Not affect TSF.		
	- Present data and time : Generated by the battery backed-up hardware		
	real-time clock, and becomes a system error at the data destruction.		

6.3.2. Dependencies of Security Functional Requirements

Table 25 describes the functional requirements that security functional requirements depend on and those that do not and the reason why it is not problematic even if dependencies are not satisfied.

Functional Requirement	Dependencies of Functional Requirements	
Requirement and its name	Requirement that	Requirement that is not dependent on
	is dependent on	and its rationale
FAU_GEN.1	FPT_STM.1	
Audit data generation		-
FAU_SAR.1	FAU_GEN.1	
Audit review		-
FAU_SAR.2	FAU_SAR.1	
Restricted audit review		-
FAU_STG.1		
Protected audit trail	FAU_GEN.1	-
storage		
FAU_STG.4		
Prevention of audit data	FAU_STG.1	-
loss		

Table 25: Dependencies of Functional Security Requirements

Functional Requirement	Depe	endencies of Functional Requirements
D 1.	Requirement that	Requirement that is not dependent on
Requirement and its name	is dependent on	and its rationale
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation (The stored data in the internal HDD)	FCS_COP.1	FCS_CKM.4: A cryptographic key is generated when MFD is booted, and stored on DRAM (volatile memory). A cryptographic key does not need to be destructed because this key is lost when the MFD main unit is powered off. Therefore, the dependency on FCS_CKM.4 does not need to be satisfied.
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation (The stored data in the internal HDD)	FCS_CKM.1	FCS_CKM.4: A cryptographic key is generated when MFD is booted, and stored on DRAM (volatile memory). A cryptographic key does not need to be destructed because this key is lost when the MFD main unit is powered off.
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control	FDP_ACF.1	-
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control	FDP_ACC.1 FMT_MSA.3	-
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control (Fax information flow)	FDP_IFF.1	-
FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes (Fax information flow)	FDP_IFC.1	FMT_MSA.3: A static attribute initialization is not required because Fax Information Flow has no security attribute.
FDP_RIP.1 Subset residual information protection		None
FIA_AFL.1(1) Authentication failure handling (Key operator)	FIA_UAU.1	
FIA_AFL.1(2) Authentication failure handling (SA, local authentication)	FIA_UAU.1	

Functional Requirement	Depe	endencies of Functional Requirements
Requirement and its name	Requirement that	Requirement that is not dependent on
Requirement and its name	is dependent on	and its rationale
FIA_AFL.1(3)		
Authentication failure	FIA_UAU.1	
handling	TIA_UAU.I	
(General user)		
FIA_AFL.1(4)		
Authentication failure		
handling	FIA_UAU.1	
(SA, remote		
authentication)		
FIA_ATD.1		None
User attribute definition		none
FIA_SOS.1		None
Verification of secrets		TIONE
FIA_UAU.1	FIA_UID.1	
Timing of authentication	TIA_UID.1	
FIA_UAU.7		
Protected authentication	FIA_UID.1	
feedback		
FIA_UID.1	None	
Timing of identification		None
FIA_USB.1	FIA_ATD.1	
User-subject binding		_
FMT_MOF.1	FMT_SMF.1	
Management of security	FMT_SMR.1	-
functions behavior		
FMT_MSA.1	FDP_ACC.1	
Management of security	FMT_SMF.1	-
attributes	FMT_SMR.1	
FMT_MSA.3	FMT_MSA.1	
Static attribute	FMT_SMR.1	-
initialization	1 141 1 _01411(.1	
FMT_MTD.1	FMT_SMF.1	_
Management of TSF data	FMT_SMR.1	
FMT_SMF.1		
Specification of	None	
management functions		
FMT_SMR.1	FIA_UID.1	
Security roles		

Functional Requirement	Dependencies of Functional Requirements		
Requirement and its name	Requirement that is dependent on	Requirement that is not dependent on and its rationale	
FPT_STM.1	Num		
Reliable time stamp	None		
FPT_TST.1	None		
TSF testing			
FTP_TRP.1	None		
Trusted Path			

6.3.3. Security Assurance Requirements Rationale

This TOE is for a MFD, a commercial product. The following threats are assumed to be caused by a low-level attacker: attack or interception/alteration of data on internal network via a MFD external interface from control panel, Web browser of system administrator's client; and reading-out of information by removing the internal HDD and connecting it to a commercial tool. To counter these threats, this TOE is required to provide the security functions which assure security.

The evaluation assurance level of the TOE is EAL3 which includes the following analyses:

- Analysis of the security measures of the TOE at development phase

(Performing/analyzing systematic tests and evaluating the management of the development environment and the developed products.)

- Analysis of whether the sufficient guidance information is included so that the security functions can be used safely.

Therefore, EAL 3 is the reasonable evaluation level for this TOE.

7. TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION

This chapter describes the summary specifications of the security functions provided by this TOE.

7.1. Security Functions

Table 26 shows security functional requirements and the corresponding TOE security functions. The security functions described in this section satisfy the TOE security functional requirements that are specified in section 6.1 of this ST.

Table 26: Security Functional Requirements and the Corresponding TOE Security Functions

Security FunctionsNoN										
Requirements I <thi< th=""> I I <thi< th=""> <thi< td=""><td>Security Functions</td><td></td><td></td><td>Н</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></thi<></thi<></thi<>	Security Functions			Н						
Requirements I <thi< th=""> I I <thi< th=""> <thi< td=""><td></td><td></td><td>X</td><td>AUT</td><td></td><td>ЛIТ</td><td></td><td>ROT</td><td>гоw</td><td>rest</td></thi<></thi<></thi<>			X	AUT		ЛIТ		ROT	гоw	rest
Requirements I <thi< th=""> I I <thi< th=""> <thi< td=""><td></td><td>M</td><td>PHE</td><td>ER_</td><td>ΤΓ</td><td></td><td>Ŋ</td><td>ET_P</td><td>$\mathbf{X}_{\mathbf{F}}$</td><td>LF_7</td></thi<></thi<></thi<>		M	PHE	ER_	ΤΓ		Ŋ	ET_P	$\mathbf{X}_{\mathbf{F}}$	LF_7
Requirements I <thi< th=""> I I <thi< th=""> <thi< td=""><td>Security Functional</td><td>F_IO</td><td>F_CI</td><td>F_US</td><td>F</td><td>F_CE</td><td>F_FA</td><td>F_NE</td><td>F_FA</td><td>F_SE</td></thi<></thi<></thi<>	Security Functional	F_IO	F_CI	F_US	F	F_CE	F_FA	F_NE	F_FA	F_SE
FAU_SAR.1 I I I I I I I I I FAU_SAR.2 I <thi< th=""> I I</thi<>	Requirements	TS	TS	TS	TS	TS	TS	TS	TST	TS
FAU_SAR.2 I I I I I I I I I FAU_STG.1 I I I I I I I I I I FAU_STG.1 I <thi< th=""> I I <thi< th=""> <thi< td=""><td>FAU_GEN.1</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>✓</td><td></td><td></td><td></td></thi<></thi<></thi<>	FAU_GEN.1						✓			
FAU_STG.1 I <thi< th=""> I <thi< th=""> <thi< t<="" td=""><td>FAU_SAR.1</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>\checkmark</td><td></td><td></td><td></td></thi<></thi<></thi<>	FAU_SAR.1						\checkmark			
FAU_STG.4 I I I I I I I I I FCS_CKM.1 I <thi< th=""> I I</thi<>	FAU_SAR.2						>			
FCS_CKM.1 ✓	FAU_STG.1						>			
FOS_COP.1 Image: Constraint of the con	FAU_STG.4						~			
FOR_COM Image: Sector of the sector of t	FCS_CKM.1		>							
FDP_ACF.1 Image: Constraint of the sector of the secto	FCS_COP.1		>							
FDP_IFC.1 Image: Constraint of the sector of the secto	FDP_ACC.1			✓						
FDP_IFF.1Image: selection of the	FDP_ACF.1			✓						
FDP_RIP.1 ✓	FDP_IFC.1								\checkmark	
FIA_AFL.1 (1) Image: Constraint of the	FDP_IFF.1								>	
FIA_AFL.1 (2) ···	FDP_RIP.1	~								
FIA_AFL.1 (3) ···	FIA_AFL.1 (1)			✓						
FIA_AFL.1 (4) ···	FIA_AFL.1 (2)			✓						
FIA_ATD.1 Image: Construction of the sector of the sec	FIA_AFL.1 (3)			✓						
FIA_SOS.1 Image: style="text-align: cell; ce	FIA_AFL.1 (4)			✓						
FIA_UAU.1 Image: Constraint of the sector of the secto	FIA_ATD.1			✓						
FIA_UAU.7 ···	FIA_SOS.1			\checkmark						
FIA_UID.1 Image: Constraint of the second secon	FIA_UAU.1			✓						
FIA_USB.1 ✓	FIA_UAU.7			✓						
FMT_MOF.1 Image: Constraint of the second	FIA_UID.1			✓						
	FIA_USB.1			✓						
FMT_MSA.1	FMT_MOF.1				~	✓				
	FMT_MSA.1			\checkmark	~					

Security Functions									
Security Functional	TSF_IOW	TSF_CIPHER	TSF_USER_AUTH	TSF_FMT	TSF_CE_LIMIT	TSF_FAU	TSF_NET_PROT	TSF_FAX_FLOW	TSF_SELF_TEST
Requirements	T	T	Ţ	T	Ţ	T	T	T	T
FMT_MSA.3				\checkmark					
FMT_MTD.1			✓	>	~				
FMT_SMF.1				✓	✓				
FMT_SMR.1			✓	✓	✓				
FPT_STM.1						\checkmark			
FPT_TST.1									✓
FTP_TRP.1							~		

The summary of each TOE security function and the corresponding security functional requirements are described below.

7.1.1. Hard Disk Data Overwrite (TSF_IOW)

According to Hard Disk Data Overwrite setting which is configured by a system administrator with the system administrator mode, the used document data in the internal HDD are deleted by either one or three pass overwrite procedure on the document data area when each job of copy, print, scan, Network Scan, fax, or Direct Fax is completed.

This is because whether to prioritize efficiency or security depends on the usage environment of the MFD.

When efficiency is prioritized, one pass overwrite procedure is applied. When security is prioritized, three pass overwrite procedure is applied. Three pass overwrite has lower processing speed than one pass but can provide more solid overwrite function. Therefore, three pass is an appropriate number of times to overwrite.

(1) FDP_RIP.1 Subset Residual Information Protection

To control the overwrite function conducted after each job, two options are available: one pass (zero) overwrite procedure and three pass (random number / random number / zero) overwrite procedure.

List of the used document data which are to be overwritten and deleted is on the internal HDD. When the existence of the used document data are found in this list at the time of booting the TOE, the overwrite function is performed.

7.1.2. Hard Disk Data Encryption (TSF_CIPHER)

According to Hard Disk Data Encryption setting which is configured by a system administrator with

the system administrator mode, the document data and security audit log data are encrypted before stored into the internal HDD when operating any function of copy, print, scan, Network Scan, fax, Direct Fax, or configuring various security function settings.

(1) FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation

The TOE uses the "hard disk data encryption seed key" configured by a system administrator and generates a 256-bit encryption key at the time of booting through FXOSENC algorithm, which is Fuji Xerox's standard method and a secure algorithm with sufficient complexity. (When the "hard disk data encryption seed key" is the same, the same cryptographic key is generated.)

(2) FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation

Before storing the document data and security audit log data into the internal HDD, the TOE encrypts the data using the 256-bit cryptographic key generated at the time of booting (FCS_CKM.1) and the AES algorithm based on FIPS PUBS 197. When reading out the stored data, the TOE decrypts the data also using the 256-bit cryptographic key generated at the time of booting and the AES algorithm.

7.1.3. User Authentication (TSF_USER_AUTH)

Access to the TOE functions is restricted to the authorized user.

A user needs to enter his/her ID and password from the fax driver, Network Scan Utility, or Web browser of the general user client, or MFD control panel. A user can also use Smart Card authentication on the control panel

After a user enters his/her ID and password, an MFD identifies and authenticates the user based on user information stored in the MFD or an external server.

There are the following two types of authentication depending on how user information is registered.

a) Local Authentication

In local authentication, authentication is managed by using the user information registered in the TOE.

b) Remote Authentication

Authentication is performed by remote authentication server. User information is not registered in the TOE. In remote authentication, authentication is performed by using the user information managed by remote authentication server (LDAP server or Kerberos server).

Only the authenticated user can use the following functions:

a) Functions controlled by the MFD control panel

Copy, fax (send), scan, network scan, Mailbox operation, and print (This print function requires the Accounting System preset from printer driver. A user must be authenticated from the control panel for print job.)

b) Functions controlled by Network Scan Utility of user client (with local authentication only)

Function to retrieve document data from Mailbox.

Functions controlled by Configuration Web Tool
 Display of device condition, display of job status and its log, function to retrieve document data from Mailbox, and print function by file designation

In addition, access to and setting change of the TOE security functions are restricted to the authorized system administrator. A system administrator needs to enter his/her ID and password from MFD control panel or system administrator client.

In Smart Card authentication, an MFD identifies and authenticates users by comparing user information and certificates stored in Smart Card (CAC/PIV) and those in Kerberos server.

Only the authenticated user can use the following functions:

• Functions controlled by the MFD control panel

Copy, fax (send), scan, network scan, Mailbox operation, and print (This print function requires the Accounting System preset from printer driver. A user must be authenticated from the control panel for print job.).

For users successfully identified and authenticated with Smart Card authentication (CAC/PIV), TOE gives the authority to refer to and change the settings of TOE's security functions from the control panel, based on the SA authority information stored in LDAP server.

For user authentication that uses Configuration Web Tool or Network Scan Utility, Smart Card information is not used. Instead, user information for local authentication or remote authentication is used.

(1) FIA_AFL.1 (1) Authentication failure handling

The function of the TOE to handle the authentication failures is provided for the key operator authentication which is performed before accessing the system administrator mode. When the number of unsuccessful authentication attempts with system administrator ID reaches 5 times, the control panel does not accept any operation except power cycle, and the web browser do not accept authentication until the MFD main unit is powered off/on.

(2) FIA_AFL.1 (2) Authentication failure handling

The function of the TOE to handle the authentication failures is provided for the SA authentication upon local authentication which is performed before accessing the system administrator mode. When the number of unsuccessful authentication attempts with system administrator ID reaches 5 times, the control panel does not accept any operation except power cycle, and the web browser do not accept authentication operation until the MFD main unit is powered off/on.

(3) FIA_AFL.1 (3) Authentication failure handling

The function of the TOE to handle the authentication failures is provided for the general user

authentication which is performed before using the MFD functions. When the entered password does not match the one set by an authorized user, the message saying "authentication was failed" is displayed on the control panel, requesting re-entry of the user information. Re-entry of user information is also required at Web browser and Network Scan Utility (with local authentication only).

(4) FIA_AFL.1 (4) Authentication failure handling

The function of the TOE to handle the authentication failures is provided for the SA authentication upon remote authentication which is performed before using the MFD functions. When the entered password does not match the one set by SA, the message saying "authentication was failed" is displayed on the control panel, requesting re-entry of the user information. Re-entry of user information is also required at Web browser.

(5) FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition

The function of the TOE to define and retain the roles of key operator, SA, and general user.

(6) FIA_SOS.1 Verification of secrets

When setting a password of SA and general user, the TOE rejects settings if the password is less than the minimum number of characters.

(7) FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication

FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification

The TOE requests a user to enter his/her ID and password before permitting him/her to operate the MFD function via Web browser, Network Scanner Utility, and fax driver of a user client, or the control panel. The entered user ID and password are verified against the data registered in the TOE setting data.

This identification (FIA_UID.1) and the authentication (FIA_UAU.1) are simultaneously performed, and the operation is allowed only when both of the identification and authentication succeed.

When receiving print job from user client, the TOE receives and stores print job in Mailbox without user identification and authentication.

When receiving fax data by the public telephone line, the TOE receives the fax data and stores them in Mailbox without user identification and authentication.

(8) FIA_UAU.7 Protected authentication feedback

The TOE offers the function to display the same number of asterisks (`*`) as the entered-password characters on the control panel, or Web browser, in order to hide the password at the time of user authentication.

(9) FIA_USB.1 User-subject binding

With the authenticated ID, TOE associates the roles of key operator, SA, and general user with the subjects.

(10) FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes

With the user authentication function, the TOE permits the authenticated user to handle the identities related to each Mailbox and Store Print as shown in Table 27.

Security Attributes	Operations	Roles
Key operator identifier	modify	Key operator
SA identifier (with local	query, modify ,delete,	Key operator, SA
authentication only)	create	
General user identifier	query, modify ,delete,	Key operator, SA
(with local authentication	create	
only)		
Mailbox owner identifier	query, delete, create	General user, SA
(Personal Mailbox)		
All Mailbox owner	query, delete	Key operator
identifier (All of Personal		
Mailbox)		
Mailbox owner identifier	query, delete, create	Key operator
(Shared Mailbox)		
Store Print owner identifier	query, delete	Key operator, SA,
		General user
All Store Print owner	query, delete	Key operator, SA
identifier		

Table 27: Management of security attributes

(11) FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data

FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions

The TOE provides the user interface for setting password only to the authenticated authorized user.

The setting of password for key operator is limited to key operator, that for SA (with local authentication only) is limited to key operator and SA, and that for general user (with local authentication only) is limited to system administrator and the general user (when it is his/her own).

(12) FMT_SMR.1 Security role

The TOE maintains the roles of system administrator and general user and associates these roles to the authorized users.

(13) FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control

FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control

With the user authentication function, the TOE permits the authenticated user to operate Mailbox and Store Print (Private Print) as shown in Table 28.

	Personal Mailbox	Shared Mailbox	Store Print
Creation of Mailbox	Available for general	Available for key	-
	user, SA	operator	
Deletion of Mailbox	Available for	Available for key	-
	registered general	operator	
	user ,SA and key		
	operator		
Retrieval and	Available for	Available for general	Available for general
Deletion of document	registered general	user, SA and key	user, SA and key
data	user ,SA and key	operator	operator
	operator		
Retrieval and	Available for key	Available for key	Available for SA and
Deletion of all	operator	operator	key operator
document data			

|--|

User authentication is performed before accessing Mailbox or Store Print.

a) Private Print Function

When the MFD is set to "Save as Private Charge Print," and a user sends a print request from the printer driver in which the Accounting System is preset, the print data are decomposed into bitmap data, classified according to the user ID, and temporarily stored in the corresponding Private Print area within the internal HDD.

In the same way, when a user is authenticated by entering his/her ID and password from Configuration Web Tool for authentication, and the user sends a print request by designating the files within a user client, the print data are temporarily stored in Private Print area according to the user ID.

To refer to the stored print data, a user needs to enter his/her ID and password from the control panel or to use Smart Card (CAC/PIV). When the user is authenticated, the data on the waiting list corresponding to the user ID are displayed. The user can request printing or deletion of the data on the list.

b) Mailbox Function

The scanned data and received fax data can be stored into Mailbox from IIT and Public Telephone Line (Fax card) which are not shown in Figure 3.

To store the scanned data into Mailbox, a user needs to enter his/her ID and password from the MFD control panel or to use Smart Card (CAC/PIV). When the user is authenticated, the

document data can be scanned from IIT and stored into the internal HDD according to the user's instruction from the control panel.

To store the received fax data into Mailbox, user authentication is not required. Among the received fax data transmitted over public telephone line, the following data are automatically classified and stored into each corresponding Mailbox: the received fax data whose corresponding Mailbox is specified by the sender, the received fax data from a particular sender (the data are classified according to the sender's telephone number), and the received fax data from an unknown sender.

To retrieve, print, or delete the stored data in the Personal Mailbox corresponding to each registered user ID, user authentication is required; the MFD compares the user ID and password preset in the MFD against those entered by a general user from the control panel, Configuration Web Tool, or Network Scan Utility (with local authentication only). For user authentication, Smart Card authentication is also available on the control panel.

- •Mailbox Operation by a General User / SA
- Creation of Personal Mailbox

When a general user / SA operates to create Personal Mailbox, the Personal Mailbox in which general user identifier / SA identifier is set as its owner is created.

- Deletion of Personal Mailbox
 When the general user identifier / SA identifier matches the owner identifier of Personal Mailbox, deletion of the corresponding Personal Mailbox is allowed.
- Retrieval and deletion of document data in Personal Mailbox
 When the general user identifier / SA identifier matches the owner identifier of Personal Mailbox, retrieval and deletion of the document data inside are allowed.
- Retrieval and deletion of document data in Shared Mailbox Retrieval and deletion of document data in Shared Mailbox are allowed.
- Store Print Operation by a General User / SA
- Deletion and retrieval of document data

When the general user identifier / SA identifier matches the owner identifier of Store Print area, retrieval and deletion of the document data inside are allowed. When the document data are deleted, the corresponding Store Print area is also deleted.

• Mailbox Operation by the Key Operator

Creation and deletion of Shared Mailbox are allowed.

For all Mailboxes, the key operator's operations to delete Mailbox, and to retrieve, and delete the document data inside are allowed.

• Store Print Operation by the Key Operator / SA For all the Store Print areas, the key operator's / SA's operations to retrieve and delete the document data inside are allowed.

7.1.4. System Administrator's Security Management (TSF_FMT)

To grant a privilege to a specific user, this function allows only the authorized system administrator to access the system administrator mode which enables him/her to refer to and configure the settings of the following TOE security functions from the control panel or system administrator client.

(1) FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions behavior

FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data

FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions

The TOE provides a user interface which allows only the authenticated system administrator to refer to / change the TOE setting data related to the following TOE security functions and to make setting whether to enable/disable each function.

With these functions, the required security management functions are provided.

The settings of the following TOE security functions can be referred to and changed from the control panel.

- Refer to the setting of Hard Disk Data Overwrite, enable/disable it, and set the number of pass (overwrite procedure);
- Refer to the setting of Hard Disk Data Encryption and enable/disable it;
- Set the cryptographic seed key for Hard Disk Data Encryption;
- Refer to the setting on the use of password entered from MFD control panel in user authentication, and enable/disable it;
- Refer to the setting of access denial due to authentication failure of system administrator identification, enable/disable it, and set the allowable number of the failures before access denial;
- Change the key operator ID and password (only a key operator is privileged);
- Refer to the setting of access denial due to authentication failure of system administrator, enable/disable it, and set the allowable number of failures;
- Refer to and set the minimum password length (for general user and SA, with local authentication only);
- Refer to the setting of SSL/TLS communication of Internal Network Data Protection, enable/disable it, and configure the details;
- Refer to the setting of IPSec communication of Internal Network Data Protection, enable/disable it, and configure the details;
- Refer to the setting of S/MIME communication of Internal Network Data Protection, enable/disable it, and configure the details;
- Refer to the setting of User Authentication and select disable/Local Authentication/Remote Authentication, and configure the details;
- Refer to the setting of Smart Card authentication, enable/disable it, and configure the details;
- Refer to the setting of Store Print and set store/print;
- Refer to and set date and time;
- Refer to the setting of Self Test and enable/disable it;

With Configuration Web Tool, the settings of the following TOE security functions can be referred to and changed from a system administrator client via Web browser.

- Change the key operator ID and password (only a key operator is privileged);
- Refer to the setting of ID of SA and general user and change the ID and password (with local authentication only);
- Refer to the setting of access denial due to authentication failures of system administrator, enable/disable it, and set the allowable number of the failures before access denial;
- Refer to and set the minimum password length (for general user and SA, with local authentication only);
- Refer to the setting of Security Audit Log and enable/disable it, (When Security Audit Log data are enabled, security audit log data can be downloaded in the form of tab-delimited text to a system administrator client.);
- Refer to the setting of SSL/TLS communication of Internal Network Data Protection, enable/disable it, and configure the details;
- Refer to the setting of IPSec communication of Internal Network Data Protection, enable/disable it, and configure the details;
- Refer to the setting of SNMP v3 communication of Internal Network Data Protection, enable/disable it, and configure the details;
- Set the authentication password for SNMPv3 communication;
- Refer to the setting of S/MIME communication of Internal Network Data Protection, enable/disable it, and configure the details;
- Download/upload and create an X.509 certificate;
- Refer to the setting of User Authentication and select disable/Local Authentication/Remote Authentication, and configure the details;
- Refer to the setting of Smart Card authentication, enable/disable it, and configure the details;
- (2) FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes

The TOE restricts the handling of the general user identifier only to a system administrator.

(3) FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization

Regarding Mailbox and Store Print, the TOE sets the user identifier created as owner identifier and the available user identifier, and set them as default values of security attributes.

(4) FMT_SMR.1 Security roles

The system administrator's role is maintained and the role is associated with a system administrator.

7.1.5. Customer Engineer Operation Restriction (TSF_CE_LIMIT)

A system administrator can restrict CE's operation in the system administrator mode to inhibit CE

from referring to / changing the settings related to System Administrator's Security Management (TSF_FMT). This function can prevent setting change by an attacker who is impersonating CE.

- (1) FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions behavior FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
 The TOE provides a user interface which allows only the authenticated system administrator to refer to / change (enable/disable) the TOE settings related to Customer Engineer Operation Restriction from the control panel and Configuration Web Tool. With these functions, the required security management functions are provided.
- (2) FMT_SMR.1 Security roles

The system administrator's role is maintained and the role is associated with a system administrator.

7.1.6. Security Audit Log (TSF_FAU)

According to Security Audit Log setting which is configured by a system administrator using the system administrator mode, the important events of the TOE such as device failure, configuration change, and user operation are traced and recorded based on when and who operated what function. All the TOE users are the targets of this audit log.

(1) FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation

It is assured that the defined auditable event is recorded in the audit log. Table 29 shows the details of the audit log data.

Table 29: Details of Security Audit Log Data

The auditable events are recorded with the following fixed size entries:

- Log ID: consecutive numbers as an audit log identifier (1 60000)
- Date: date data (yyyy/mm/dd, mm/dd/yyyy, or dd/mm/yyyy)
- Time: time data (hh:mm:ss)
- Logged Events: event name (arbitrary characters of up to 32 digits)
- User Name: user name (arbitrary characters of up to 32 digits)
- Description: description on events (arbitrary characters of up to 32 digits, see below for details)
- Status: status or result of event processing (arbitrary characters of up to 32 digits, see below for details)
- Optionally Logged Items: additional information recorded to audit log (except common record items)

Logged Events	Description	Status
Change in Device Stat	us	
System Status	Started normally (cold boot)	
	Started normally (warm boot)	-

Logged Events	Description	Status		
	Shutdown requested			
	User operation (Local)	Start/End		
	Self Test	Successful/Failed		
User Authentication				
	Login	Successful, Failed (Invalid		
Login/Logout	Logout	UserID), Failed (Invalid Password), Failed		
	Locked System Administrator	-		
	Authentication	(Number of authentication		
	Detected continuous Authentication Fail	failures recorded)		
Change in Audit Polic		,		
Audit Policy	Audit Log	Enable/Disable		
Job Status		1		
	Print			
	Сору	Completed, Completed		
	Scan	with Warnings, Canceled		
Job Status	Fax	by User, Canceled by		
	Mailbox	Shutdown, Aborted,		
	Print Reports	Unknown		
	Job Flow Service			
Change in Device Sett	tings	•		
	Adjust Time			
	Create Mailbox	Successful/Failed		
Device Settings	Delete Mailbox			
	Switch Authentication Mode	Successful		
	Change Security Setting	(Setting items recorded)		
Access to Data Stored	in Device			
	Import Certificate			
Device Data	Delete Certificate			
	Add Address Entry	Successful/Eq:1ad		
	Delete Address Entry	Successful/Failed		
	Edit Address Entry			
	Export Audit Log			
		Failed		
Communication	Trusted Communication	(Protocol and		
Communication		communication		
		destination stored)		

(2) FAU_SAR.1 Audit review

It is assured that all the information recorded in the audit log can be retrieved. Security audit log data can be downloaded in the form of tab-delimited text by pressing the button "store as a text file." To download security audit log data, SSL/TLS communication needs to be enabled before using Web browser.

(3) FAU_SAR.2 Restricted audit review

The person who retrieves the security audit log data is limited to the authenticated system administrator. A system administrator can access the security audit log data only via Web browser and the access from the control panel is inhibited. Therefore, a system administrator needs to log in from Web browser to access the security audit log data.

(4) FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage

There is no function to delete the security audit log data, and the security audit log data are protected from untrusted alteration and modification.

(5) FAU_STG.4 Prevention of audit data loss

When security audit log data are full, the oldest stored audit record is overwritten with the new data so that the new data is not lost but surely recorded.

Auditable events are stored with time stamps into NVRAM. When the number of stored events reaches 50, the 50 logs on NVRAM is stored into one file ("audit log file") within the internal HDD. Up to 15,000 events can be stored. When the number of recorded events exceeds 15,000, the oldest audit log file is overwritten and a new audit event is stored.

(6) FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps

The time stamp of TOE's clock function is issued when the defined auditable event is recorded in the audit log file.

By TSF_FMT, only a system administrator is enabled to change the clock setting.

7.1.7. Internal Network Data Protection (TSF_NET_PROT)

Internal Network Data Protection is provided by the following four protocols which are configured by a system administrator using the system administrator mode:

(1) FTP_TRP.1 Trusted Path

The document data, security audit log data, and TOE setting data are protected by the encryption communication protocol that ensures secure data communication between the TOE and IT products (communication service via Web, communication service for printer driver, communication service for fax driver, communication service for network utility, communication service for other services which require trusted path). This trusted path is logically distinct from other communication paths and provides assured identification of its endpoints and protection of

the communication data from modification or disclosure.

a) SSL/TLS

According to the SSL/TLS communication which is configured by a system administrator using the system administrator mode, SSL/TLS ensuring secure data transmission is supported. This protects the security of document data, security audit log data, and TOE setting data on the internal network.

By supporting SSL/TLS, the TOE can act as SSL/TLS server or SSL/TLS client. Moreover, SSL/TLS can protect data transmission between the TOE and the remote from interception and alteration. Protection from interception is realized by encrypting transmission data with the following cryptographic keys. A cryptographic key is generated at the time of starting a session and lost at the time of ending the session or powering off the MFD main unit. Cryptographic key generated as SSLv3/TLSv1/TLSv1.2 upon every session Specifically, one of the cryptographic suites below is adopted:

Cryptographic Suites of SSL/TLS	Cryptographic Method and	Hash Method
	Size of Secret Key	
SSL_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA	RC4 / 128 bits	SHA-1
SSL_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA	3-Key Triple-DES / 168 bits	SHA-1
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA	AES / 128 bits	SHA-1
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA	AES / 256 bits	SHA-1
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256	AES / 128 bits	SHA256
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256	AES / 256 bits	SHA256

Protection from the alteration is realized by HMAC (Hashed Message Authentication Code - IETF RFC 2104) of SSL/TLS.

When SSL/TLS communication is enabled on the Web client, requests from the client must be received via HTTPS. The SSL/TLS communication needs to be enabled before IPSec, SNMPv3, or S/MIME is enabled or before security audit log data are downloaded by a system administrator.

b) IPSec

According to the IPSec communication which is configured by a system administrator using the system administrator mode, IPSec ensuring secure data transmission is supported. This protects the security of document data, security audit log data, and TOE setting data on the internal network.

IPSec establishes the security association to determine the parameters (*e.g.* private key and cryptographic algorithm) to be used in the IPSec communication between the TOE and the remote. After the association is established, all transmission data among the specified IP addresses are encrypted by the transport mode of IPSec until the TOE is powered off or reset. A cryptographic key is generated at the time of starting a session and lost at the time of ending the session or powering off the MFD main unit.

Cryptographic key generated as IPSec (ESP: Encapsulating Security Payload) at every session Specifically, one of the following combinations between secret-key cryptographic method and hash method is adopted:

Cryptographic Method and Size	Hash Method
of Secret Key	
AES / 128 bits	SHA-1
3-Key Triple-DES / 168 bits	SHA-1

c) SNMPv3

According to the SNMP v3 communication which is configured by a system administrator using the system administrator mode, SNMP v3 is supported. This is one of the security solutions for the network management protocol, SNMP. As defined in IETF RFC3414, SNMP v3 is used for not only data encryption but also authentication of each SNMP message.

To enable this function, both authentication password and privacy password need to be set up in both the TOE and the remote server. Length of both passwords must be 8 characters or more. Authentication of SNMP v3 uses SHA-1 hash function; encryption of the protocol uses CBC-DES. A cryptographic key is generated at the time of starting a session and lost at the time of ending the session or powering off the MFD main unit.

Cryptographic key generated as SNMP v3 at every session:

Cryptographic Method and Size	Hash Method
of Secret Key	
DES / 56 bits	SHA-1

d) S/MIME

According to the S/MIME communication which is configured by a system administrator using the system administrator mode, S/MIME ensuring secure mail communication is supported. This protects the security of document data on the internal and external networks.

By S/MIME encrypting mail function, the document data being transmitted to/from the outside by E-mail are protected from interception. By S/MIME signature mail function, the document data are protected from interception and alteration.

A cryptographic key is generated at the time of starting mail encryption and lost at the time of completion of the encryption or powering off the MFD main unit.

Secret-key cryptographic method generated as S/MIME for every mail

Cryptographic Method and Size
of Secret Key
3Key Triple-DES/168 bits
AES / 128 bits
AES / 192 bits
AES / 256 bits

Hash method generated as S/MIME for every mail

hash method
SHA1
SHA256

7.1.8. Fax Flow Security (TSF_FAX_FLOW)

This function inhibits unauthorized access to the TOE via the Fax card in the controller board, at any case. The data on public telephone line are not delivered to the internal network.

(1) FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control

FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes

The data on public telephone line are not delivered to the internal network.

7.1.9. Self Test (TSF_S_TEST)

The TOE can execute a self test function to verify the integrity of TSF executable code and TSF data.

(1) FPT_TST.1 TSF testing

TOE verifies the area of NVRAM and SEEPROM including TSF data upon initiation, and displays an error on the control panel if an error occurs.

However, an error is not detected for the data on audit logs and time and date as these are not included in the target. Also, when Self Test function is set to be executed upon initiation, TOE calculates the checksum of Controller ROM to confirm if it matches the specified value, and displays an error on the control panel if an error occurs.

8. ACRONYMS AND TERMINOLOGY

8.1. Acronyms

The following acronyms are used in this ST:

Acronym	Definition
ADF	Auto Document Feeder
CAC	Common Access Card
CC	Common Criteria
CE	Customer Engineer / Customer Service Engineer
DRAM	Dynamic Random Access Memory
EAL	Evaluation Assurance Level
FIPS PUB	Federal Information Processing Standard publication
IIT	Image Input Terminal
IOT	Image Output Terminal
IT	Information Technology
IP	Internet Protocol
MFD	Multi Function Device
NVRAM	Non Volatile Random Access Memory
OCSP	Online Certificate Status Protocol
PDL	Page Description Language
PIV	Personal Identity Verification
PP	Protection Profile
SAR	Security Assurance Requirement
SEEPROM	Serial Electronically Erasable and Programmable Read Only Memory
SFP	Security Function Policy
SFR	Security Functional Requirement
SMTP	Simple Mail Transfer Protocol
SOF	Strength of Function
ST	Security Target
TOE	Target of Evaluation
TSF	TOE Security Function

8.2. Terminology

The following terms are used in this ST:

Term	Definition
User	Any entity outside the TOE who interacts with the TOE: <i>i.e.</i> general user,
	system administrator, and CE.
System Administrator	A user authorized by key operator to manage MFD maintenance and
Privilege (SA)	configure TOE security functions.
System Administrator	An authorized user who manages MFD maintenance and configures TOE
	security functions. This term covers both key operator and SA.
Customer Engineer (CE)	Customer service engineer, an engineer who maintains and repairs MFD.
Attacker	A malicious user of TOE
Control Donal	A panel of MFD on which buttons, lamps, and a touch screen panel are
Control Panel	mounted to operate the MFD
General User Client	A client for general user.
System Administrator	A client for system administrator. An administrator can refer to and rewrite
Client	TOE setting data of MFD via Web browser.
	Configuration Web Tool is a service on a Web server in the TOE to
	confirm the status of the TOE, change settings of the TOE, and request
	retrieval and printing of documents toward the TOE via the Web browser
Configuration Web	of the user client.
Tool	Configuration Web Tool can be used via the Windows standard Web
	browser.
	The full name of Configuration Web Tool is Dell Printer Configuration
	Web Tool.
	An operation mode that enables a system administrator to refer to and
System Administrator	rewrite TOE setting for device operation and that for security functions
Mode	according to the operational environment. This mode is distinguished from
	the operation mode that enables a general user to use the MFD functions.
	Software for Direct Fax (with local authentication only) function, which
Fax Driver	enables a general user to fax data to the destination directly from a general
	user client through MFD. The user can send the fax data just as printing.
	Used on the user client.
Network Scan Utility	Software for a general user client to retrieve the document data stored in
(with local	Mailbox of MFD.
authentication only)	
	Software to convert the data on a general user client into print data written
Printer driver	in page description language (PDL), a readable format for MFD. Used on
	the user client.

Term	Definition
Print Data	The data written in PDL, a readable format for MFD, which are to be converted into bitmap data by the TOE decompose function.
Control Data	The data that are transmitted by command and response interactions. This is one the type of the data transmitted between MFD hardware units.
Bitmap Data	The decomposed data of the data read by the copy function and the print data transmitted from a user client to MFD by the print function. Bitmap data are stored into the internal HDD after being compressed in the unique process.
Decompose Function	A function to analyze and convert the print data written in PDL into bitmap data.
Decompose	To analyze and convert the data written in PDL into bitmap data by the decompose function.
Original	Texts, images and photos to be read from IIT in the copy function.
Document Data	Document data means all the data, including images, transmitted across the MFD when any of copy, print, scan or fax functions is used by a general user. The document data includes: - Bitmap data read from IIT and printed out from IOT (copy function), - Print data sent by general user client and its decomposed bitmap data (print function), - Bitmap data read from IIT and then stored into the internal HDD (scan function), - Bitmap data read from IIT and sent to the fax destination and the bitmap data faxed from the sender's machine and printed out from the recipient's IOT (fax function).
Used Document Data	The remaining data in the MFD internal HDD even after deletion. The document data are first stored into the internal HDD, used, and then only their files are deleted.
Security Audit Log Data	The chronologically recorded data of important events of the TOE. The events such as device failure, configuration change, and user operation are recorded based on when and who caused what event and its result.
Internally Stored Data	The data which are stored in a general user client or in the general client and server, but do not include data regarding TOE functions.
General Data	The data on the internal network. The general data do not include data regarding TOE functions.
TOE Setting Data	The data which are created by the TOE or for the TOE and may affect the TOE security functions. Included in the TSF data, specifically they include the information regarding the functions of Hard Disk Data Overwrite, Hard Disk Data Encryption, System Administrator's Security Management, Customer Engineer Operation Restriction, Use of password entered from MFD control panel in user authentication, ID and password

Term	Definition
	of users, access denial due to authentication failure of system administrator, Internal Network Data Protection, Security Audit Log, User Authentication, Report Print, Auto Clear, Data/Time, and Self Test.
General Client and Server	Client and server which do not directly engage in TOE operations
Deletion from the Internal Hard Disk Drive (HDD)	Deletion from the internal HDD means deletion of the management information. When deletion of document data from the internal HDD is requested, only the management information corresponding to the data is deleted. Therefore, user cannot access the document data which were logically deleted. However, the document data themselves are not deleted but remain as the used document data until new data is written in the same storage area.
Overwrite	To write over the area of the document data stored in the internal HDD when deleting the data.
Cryptographic Seed Key	The 12 alphanumeric characters to be entered by a user. When data in the internal HDD are encrypted, a cryptographic key is generated based on the cryptographic seed key.
Cryptographic Key	The 256-bit data which is automatically generated based on the cryptographic seed key. Before the data are stored into the internal HDD, they are encrypted with the cryptographic key.
Network	A general term to indicate both external and internal networks.
External Network	The network which cannot be managed by the organization that manages the TOE. This does not include the internal network.
Internal Network	Channels between MFD and highly reliable remote server / client PC. The channels are located in the network of the organization, the owner of the TOE, and are protected from the security risks coming from the external network.
User Authentication	A function to limit the accessible TOE functions by identifying the user before he/she uses each TOE function. There are two modes, Local Authentication and Remote Authentication, and either mode is used for operation. Smart Card authentication is also available on the control panel.
Local Authentication	A mode to manage user authentication of the TOE using the user information registered in the MFD.
Remote	A mode to manage user authentication of the TOE using the user
Authentication	information registered in the remote authentication server.
USB Media	A USB flash drive (USB memory) that is used for storing scanned data and for printing stored data.
Smart Card	A function to identify and authenticate users by communicating with
Authentication	Kerberos server and OCSP server using user information and certificates

Term	Definition
	stored in Smart Card (CAC/PIV).
OCSP Server	The OCSP (Online Certificate Status Protocol) is a protocol for obtaining
	the revocation status of X. 509 digital certificates in real time. A server
	that can use the OCSP is called an OCSP server (or OCSP responder).
	With an OCSP server, a client does not need to obtain and verify a CRL.

9. REFERENCES

The following documentation was used to prepare this ST.

Short Name	Document Title
[CC Part 1]	Part 1: Introduction and general model (September 2012 Version 3.1 Revision 4)
	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Version 3.1
	Part 1: Introduction and general model, dated September 2012, CCMB-2012-09-001
	(Japanese version 1.0, dated November 2012,
	translated by Information-Technology Promotion Agency, Japan)
[CC Part 2]	Part 2: Security functional components (September 2012 Version 3.1 Revision 4)
	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Version 3.1
	Part 2: Security functional components, dated September 2012, CCMB-2012-09-002
	(Japanese version 1.0, dated November 2012,
	translated by Information-Technology Promotion Agency, Japan)
	Part 3: Security assurance components (September 2012 Version 3.1 Revision 4)
	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Version 3.1
[CC Part 3]	Part 3: Security assurance components, dated September 2012, CCMB-2012-09-003
	(Japanese version1.0, dated November 2012,
	translated by Information-Technology Promotion Agency, Japan)
[CEM]	Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Version 3.1
	Evaluation Methodology, dated September 2012, CCMB-2012-09-004
	(Japanese version 1.0, dated November,
	translated by Information-Technology Promotion Agency, Japan)